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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explains Egypt’s rise to preeminence in the Arab Middle East from 
1952 to 1967.  It examines the implementation of President Nasser’s domestic and 
foreign policies as prescribed by the ideology of pan-Arabism and how this ideology, 
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influence within the region.  This thesis also considers how, after Nasser’s death, the new 
policies and personal leadership of his successor, President Sadat, led to Egypt’s 
abandonment of the role Nasser had staked out for it.  Sadat’s refusal to allow the 
ideology of pan-Arabism to dominate his domestic and foreign policies opened the door 
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This thesis seeks to examine how Egypt became a regional political power in the 
Arab Middle East and united the region under its leadership during the two decades 
following the Second World War.  In this thesis, power is defined as Egypt’s ability to 
exert political influence on the other countries in the Arab Middle East. Leadership is 
defined as Egypt’s ability to unite the countries in the Arab Middle East behind them 
against Western influence in the region. 
Historical research was conducted to explain the emergence of Egypt as a regional 
political power and leader of the Arab Middle East during the period from 1952 until 
1967.  This period coincided with the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser as President of Egypt 
and the Arab defeat in the Six Day War with Israel. Egypt’s preeminence was rooted in 
part in its geographic location, agricultural and industrial based economy, social 
structure, military power, and handling of international events; however, these material 
advantages, being of long standing, alone do not explain why Egypt rose to leadership 
during this period.  Egypt currently possesses these material advantages, but does not 
enjoy the same regional political power and leadership role it once had. 
While material advantages can not be discarded as contributors to Egypt’s rise in 
power, the hypothesis for this thesis is that Nasser’s personal leadership and particularly 
his embrace of pan-Arabism as a governing ideology were decisive factors that enabled 
Egypt’s rise in power in the aftermath of the Second World War. Pan-Arabism, as 
practiced under Nasser’s vigorous leadership, transformed Egypt’s long-standing material 
advantages into a base from which regional leadership could be exercised.   The other 
nations comprising the Arab Middle East had not followed Egypt’s lead in the past, and 
generally do not do so now.  However, from 1952 thru 1967 these Arab Middle East 
nations did follow Egypt’s lead.  The explanation for this shift lies in the skillful 





The answers to the question of how Egypt became a regional power and how it 
united the region under Egyptian leadership are important in a number of ways.  Above 
all, the answer to the question will enhance the general knowledge of scholars interested 
in Arab Middle East history. In addition, the question itself leads to an appreciation of 
how regional ideology and personal leadership can shape a country’s domestic and 
international policies in ways that may enhance its international role.  This time period in 
Arab Middle Eastern history is unique, because it is the only time that the Arab Middle 
East was able to unite under a common ideology.  It is important for policy advisors to 
understand the factors behind a unique international occurrence, so they can recognize 
similar factors in future events.  By recognizing these factors, policy advisors will be able 
to shape future policies that could result in better relations between the United States and 
the Arab Middle East, and further progress in social, political, and economic reforms in 
Arab Middle East countries.   
Egypt is the only country in the Arab Middle East that has been successful in 
uniting and leading its neighbors for any significant period of time.  This success 
occurred during the Presidency of Nasser.  Since Nasser’s death in 1970, Egypt has fallen 
out of the leadership role and many different countries have tried to ascend to the 
leadership role with little to no success.  There continues to be a power struggle between 
the countries in the Arab Middle East to fill the leadership role, which accounts for some 
of the tension in the region.  The countries in the Arab Middle East are still striving to 
unite under a common idea or identity, which is part of the reason for the continued 
expansion of the Arab League.   
Since losing its preeminence in the 1970s, Egypt still maintains some level of 
leadership in the Arab Middle East, although not to the extent it once did.  Even today the 
international community, both Western powers and Arab countries, rely on Egypt to exert 





C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis seeks to explain how Egypt was able to emerge as a regional political 
power and leader of the Arab Middle East during the Presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser.  
To be able to accomplish this type of research a historical analysis of the connection of 
the ideology of pan-Arabism and Nasser’s leadership to the following material 
advantages was conducted:  geographic location, agricultural and industrial based 
economy, social structure, military power, and handling of international events.  
Specifically this thesis evaluates the rise of Egypt from 1952 to 1967, the fall of Egypt 
from 1967 to 1979, and the changes that occurred during those years.  Looking at each 
one of these material advantages and their connection to pan-Arabism and Nasser’s 
leadership during the 1950s and 1960s should provide insight into how a regional 
ideology coupled with personal leadership can help a country ascend to a leadership role.   
It was necessary to use Egypt, for this historical analysis, because it was the only 
country in the Arab Middle East that was able to use the connection to emerge as the 
leader and regional political power.  This specific time period was chosen because it was 
the only period in time in which the Arab Middle East was united under a common 
identity and the ideology of pan-Arabism was a very strong force in the region. 
To accomplish research with respect to Nasser’s handling of specific international 
events and Egypt’s foreign policy, it was necessary to review Nasser’s foreign policy 
speeches.  These speeches occurred in the 1950s and 60s.  The majority of this part of the 
research relied on history books about that time period.  This research provided a good 
overview of the international conflicts in which Egypt participated during the specified 
period of time.  To understand Egyptian military strength, it was necessary to rely on 
history books and educational research articles.   
To understand the domestic policies, this research relied history and political 
economy books and journal articles for the primary research sources.  This research 
material provided insight into how Nasser dealt with the economy, social, and political 
aspects of the country.  The political economy and journal articles helped to relate 
Nasser’s domestic policies with the ideology of pan-Arabism.   
4 
Finally, to gain a thorough understanding of pan-Arabism, research relied heavily 
on journal articles, which provided more recent information, and books related to pan-
Arabism.  These sources complimented each other and provided insight into the ideology 
of pan-Arabism. 
 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I has two major functions.  The first is to explain the purpose and 
importance of the research behind this thesis. The second is to summarize the research 
methodology and sources that were used, which particular emphasis on the variety of 
scholarly opinions and different types of literature used to formulate the central argument 
and conclusion presented here.   
Chapter II’s primary function is to provide the necessary background information 
of the British occupation of Egypt and how that occupation influenced the rise of the 
Officer Corps within Egypt and Nasser’s eventual rise to the Egyptian Presidency in 
1952.   
Chapter III provides an overview of pan-Arabist ideology and its spread 
throughout the Arab Middle East.  It begins by defining what pan-Arabism was and 
concludes with an explanation of the emergence and importance of the ideology of pan-
Arabism in Egypt.   
Chapter IV considers the rise of Egyptian power and influence within the Arab 
Middle East under the Presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser from 1952 until 1967.  This 
chapter begins with a look at how pan-Arabism and Nasser influenced the domestic 
policies of Egypt in order to make it a regional political power in the Arab Middle East.  
The specific domestic policies include geography, economic, social, political, and 
military policies. Chapter IV also discusses the foreign policies of Nasser through the 
1967 War, with reference to the influence Pan-Arabism on Egyptian conduct. 
Chapter V looks at the fall of Egyptian power and influence from the end of the 
1967 Israeli-Arab War until the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.  This 
chapter begins by looking at the effects of the Egyptian/Arab loss of the 1967 war on 
5 
Egypt’s foreign and domestic policies.  It also looks at how the death of Nasser affected 
the ideology of pan-Arabism.  Finally this chapter analyzes Egypt’s normalization of 
relations between the United States and the signing of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. 
Chapter VI summarizes and evaluates the conditions that allowed Egypt to rise in 
power and influence in the Arab Middle East between 1952 and 1979, and those that led 
to its subsequent decline from preeminence.  It also considers Egypt’s current and future 
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II. EGYPT UNDER THE BRITISH 
A.  CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The following background information provides a brief historical look at how 
Egypt emerged as an independent country and how foreign imperial powers influenced 
the country.  The sections discuss how the British influenced the economic, political, and 
social aspects of Egypt and how that influence allowed Nasser and the Free Officer’s 
Corps to emerge in 1952. 
 
B. BRITISH OCCUPATION 
The British occupation of Egypt had both positive and negative effects on the 
manner in which Egypt emerged as a strong and independent Middle Eastern country.  
Egypt become a protectorate of Britain in 1883 and remained part of the British Empire 
until its complete independence in 1952.  During these sixty-seven years of imperial rule, 
Egypt went through major political and economic changes.  During this imperial rule, 
Britain’s only concern and goal for Egypt was keeping the cotton and other agricultural 
products flowing out of Egypt to Britain and keeping the Suez Canal open for trade.  All 
economic policies implemented by the British, were geared towards this concern and 
goal.  The British also sought to maintain total control over the political sector in order to 
accomplish this goal.  This did not resonate well with the Egyptian population, as they 
viewed it as just another example of a European power keeping Egyptians from forming a 
free and independent country.  The result of the British occupation was the formation of 
the first political and social groups within Egypt, which was vital to the eventual 
independence of Egypt. 
Between 1883 and 1907, Egypt was administered by Lord Cromer, who was the 
first administer of Egypt. Lord Cromer implemented economic policies that pushed for 
free trade of the products produced by Egypt; these policies ultimately led to the 
increased production of cotton.1  With this push for free trade and the increase in cotton 
                                                 
1 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), 104. 
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production, Egypt experienced an expansion in its industrial sector, expansion necessary 
to support this increase cotton exportation.  A result of this expansion of the industrial 
sector was the formation of the first unions within Egypt.  The Egyptian population 
working within the factories organized to fight for better pay and working conditions.  
Ultimately the British government was successful in putting down the unions, but not 
before the idea of forming groups opposed to British occupation was firmly implanted 
into the minds of the Egyptian population minds.  The fight against British occupation 
received more support after the Dinshaway incident of June 1906. 
The Dinshaway incident of June 1906 can be described as the killing of a local 
religious leader by British soldiers.2  Though it was an accident, it incited local outrage 
and violence.  The violence resulted in the wounding of the British soldiers.  The people 
of Egypt wanted justice for the death of their religious leader.  The British wanted to 
make an example of the Egyptians who participated in the incident to show the rest of the 
population that it was not in their interest to stand up against the British occupation.3  
Instead of disciplining the British soldiers, the government had a public trial and 
execution of some of the local villagers.  This further outraged the population of Egypt 
and lead to more opposition to the occupation.  The British underestimated the resolve of 
the Egyptian population and brought in new administrators to try and salvage the 
situation.   
The first new administrator was Sir Eldon Gorst, who administered the country 
from 1907-1911 and the second administrator was Kitchener, who administered the 
country from 1911-1914.  During both of these administrations, policies were 
implemented to try and address the political and social concerns felt within the country.  
“Gorst attempted to create a "moderate" nationalism which ultimately failed because the 
nationalists refused to make any compromises over independence and because Britain 
considered any concession to the nationalists a sign of weakness.”4Gorst was successful 
in opening selected high-ranking administration positions to Egyptians.  This helped 
                                                 
2 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 108. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Federal Research Division. Egypt: A Country Study, edited by Helen Chapin, Federal Research 
Division. 5th ed. Washington, D.C.: 1991, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+eg0036) (accessed March 2, 2007). 
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satisfy some of the opposition’s request of allowing Egyptians to govern Egyptians, but 
the ultimate goal of the opposition was independence.  When Kitchener came to Egypt in 
1911 he attempted to implement a new constitution in the country.  This new constitution 
gave the country some representative institutions locally and nationally. Prior to this the 
country had what is known as The Assembly of Delegates which later was superseded by 
an assembly and legislative council that were consultative bodies.5   This council’s job 
was to advise the government on policy, not to enact policy.   By the time this new 
constitution was formally introduced in 1913 it was too late to try and satisfy the 
opposition.  The opposition movement had grown too strong and many political parties 
were forming that wanted the British expelled from Egypt. 
The two main political parties that were formed on a platform of opposition to the 
British occupation were the Watani Party and the Umma Party.  The Watani party was 
seen more as an extremist organization and called for the immediate withdrawal of the 
British from Egypt.6  The party was headed by Kamil, who had more of an Islamic 
ideology.  He believed that reform was needed in the country, but that the British were 
not needed to accomplish this reform.  This mind set attracted many in Egyptian society, 
but Kamil’s death in 1908 resulted in a loss of center for the party and by 1952 the party 
no longer played a role in Egyptian politics.  The Umma Party enjoyed much greater 
success than the Watani Party.  The Umma Party was founded by Mahmud Sulayman 
Pasha and Hasan Abd ar Raziq.  This party was seen as a moderate party.  Like the 
Watani Party, the Umma Party wanted independence from Great Britain, but they did not 
want to attack the British directly.  Instead they sought to reform Egyptian laws and 
institutions and the participation of Egyptians in public life.7  Much of this was based on 
Islam as well, but a more modern form of the religion that allowed for the 
accommodation of the modern world.  The Umma Party was able to reach out to more 
people in the society because many of their members were editors of Egyptian  
 
                                                 
5 Federal Research Division, Egypt: A Country Study, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+eg0036) (accessed: March 30, 2007). 
6 Federal Research Division, Egypt: A Country Study, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+eg0037) (accessed: March 30, 2007). 
7 Ibid. 
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newspapers.  This allowed for the spreading of the party’s ideology and calls for reform 
to a much more broad audience.  Both of these parties set the stage for a push for 
Egyptian independence after World War I. 
After World War I an Egyptian delegation, led by a man named Zaghlul, went to 
Britain and proposed that they be allowed to attend the Paris Peace Conference in the 
hopes of determining and influencing Egypt’s future.  The British turned down the 
request, which proved to be a mistake.  When the delegation returned from Britain, 
Zaghlul and the rest of the delegation were able to mobilize the Egyptian society against 
the British in order to gain independence.  Zaghlul formed what is now called the Wafd 
Party.  For the next three to four years there were many strikes and protests throughout 
the country.  Many of these strikes and protests affected the economy of the country and 
ultimately also had an affect on Britain and their economy.  At this point in time, the 
British no longer wanted to deal with the day to day running of the country.  By 1919, the 
British began sending envoys to Egypt to figure out how to give the country self 
governing institutions, but still protect the British interests in Egypt.8  By 1920, the 
British realized that they needed to compromise with Zaghlul to get what they wanted.  
The British Lord Milner met with Zaghlul in the summer of 1920.  The result of this 
meeting was the Milner-Zaghlul Agreement.  This agreement was announced in February 
1921 and stated that Britain would accept the abolition of the protectorate as the basis for 
negotiation of a treaty with Egypt. The British had finally given in to Egyptian demands 
for independence; however, this independence was limited. 
In order for the country to begin to govern itself, Britain elevated the Sultan of 
Egypt to King.  Even though Egypt had gained independence from Britain, the European 
power still had a lot of influence and control in the country.  The British maintained 
direct control of four major areas in Egyptian society.  They included: “security of 
imperial communications of Egypt, the defense of Egypt against foreign aggression or 
interference, the protection of foreign interests and foreign minorities, and Sudan and its 
future status.”9  In other words, the British kept control over all aspects of the country  
 
                                                 
8 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 196. 
9 Ibid. 
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that was in their interest and not in the best interests of the Egyptian people.  A 
constitution was signed and implemented in 1923, leading to future expansion of the 
Egyptian political system. 
The period of 1923-1936 has been labeled as the Liberal Experiment in Egypt.10  
During this time period there were many struggles to gain power and a national unity in 
the newly independent country.  Under the new constitution, the first parliamentary 
elections were held in January 1924.  The Wafd Party won a large portion of the seats, 
which led to Zaghlul’s election as Prime Minister.  This resulted in many political 
problems for the country.  The constitution gave the King ultimate authority.  He had the 
power to appoint the Prime Minister and dissolve parliament.  The King wanted to 
preserve his royal rights and thus dissolved the parliament when he felt his powers were 
being decreased.  Another political problem for the country was Zaghlul’s and the Wafd 
Party’s inability to compromise.  He and his party did not agree with the four reserved 
areas the British kept as a result of independence, so there was a constant struggle 
between his party, the British, and the King to end all British association with Egyptian 
society.  A third political problem for the new Egyptian political system was British 
interference.  Because the British had large economic interests they interfered and 
undermined the parliament in order to keep hold on those interests.  All of these problems 
continued until 1936. 
From 1936 to 1952, there was a constant struggle between the British and the 
Egyptians surrounding how free and independent Egypt really was.  New treaties and 
compromises were made on both sides to allow Egypt to become fully independent.  One 
treaty in particular was the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.  Under this treaty, Britain 
recognized Egypt’s sovereignty, allowed Britain to leave some forces in the Suez Canal 
Zone as part of a defense agreement, and Egypt was admitted in to the League of 
Nations.11  Even with this new treaty full independence was not accomplished until 1952 
and the Free Officer’s Corps overthrow of the British backed King in July 1952. 
 
                                                 
10 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 196-200. 
11 Ibid., 197 and 200. 
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C. RISE OF THE OFFICER’S CORPS 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s leadership and charisma were essential to his rise within 
the Free Officer’s Corps and the eventual overthrow of the British backed government in 
Egypt.  This leadership and charisma can be traced back to Nasser’s beginnings in 
Egyptian society and politics.  Nasser did not seek to become a leader or icon within 
Egypt and eventually the Arab Middle East, but the way he connected with people 
allowed him to ascend to those roles. 
Nasser was born in a suburb of Alexandria on January 15, 1918.  He was born 
into a middle class family, which many scholars would suggest is what allowed him to 
connect with all classes of people.  Nasser’s family did belong were considered local 
notables within the suburb, because they did own a few acres of land which many citizens 
did not.12  For much of his childhood Nasser moved around with his father from city to 
city within Egypt.  The moving around the country allowed Nasser to attend many 
different schools and meet many different people.  Nasser was able to get a better 
understanding about Egypt as a country and society.  As scholar Aburish states, “Nasser 
was able to broaden his horizons.”13  
At age 19, Nasser applied to the Obassia Military College, which was Egypt’s 
leading officer’s cadet school.  His application was turned down, but this did not stop 
Nasser from applying again with the sponsorship of the Secretary of State, after which 
was admitted.  While attending the military college, Nasser’s horizons were further 
expanded.  The students who attend the college came from all different classes within 
society.  He quickly made friends with Anwar Sadat and Abdel Hakim Amer, who later 
became his closest allies and confidants with the Free Officer’s Corps.  After graduating 
from the military college, Nasser received postings to many different regions throughout 
Egypt and Sudan.  While at these different postings, Nasser began to hear the whisperings 
of unhappiness with the government from other military officers.  Nasser’s generation 
viewed the British occupation as the cause of all the problems of the country and the 
                                                 
12 Said K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 8. 
13 Ibid., 10. 
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government was a puppet of the British.  While Nasser did not participate in these 
whisperings, this was going to change by 1942. 
In 1942, the British Ambassador to Egypt ordered King Farouk to dismiss Prime 
Minister Maher and appoint Mustapha Naha, who was more pro-British.  To make sure 
this order was followed the British Ambassador surrounded the palace with a battalion of 
British troops and threatened to arrest the king.  This action by the British made Nasser 
even more skeptical and opposed to British presence in Egypt.  Nasser viewed this action 
by the British as a violation and threat to Egyptian sovereignty.  What made it worse was 
the fact that the Egyptian army did not try and protect the king.  In a letter he wrote to a 
fellow officer Nasser stated, “I am ashamed that our army did not respond to this 
attack.”14  Nasser was not the only Egyptian officer who felt this way.  Many of his close 
friends from military college felt the same way.  Here is when the beginnings of the Free 
Officer’s Corps began.   
From 1942 to 1948, Nasser attended the Egyptian Military Staff College and 
taught at the military college he had once attended.  During this time period Nasser 
became more involved in political activism within Egypt and even made connections 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic Group established in Egypt in 1928.  Through 
his political activism, Nasser became more vocal in his opposition to the British and need 
for full Egyptian independence.  He also looked at recruiting other members of the 
Egyptian army officers to voice join his opposition to the British.  By 1947, Nasser 
became involved in yet another military engagement which questioned his loyalty to the 
King.   
In 1947, the United Nations decided to partition Palestine to allow for an Israeli 
State.  Nasser offered his services to the Arab Higher Committee and mufti, which was 
recruiting volunteers to join the Liberation Army and fight against the partition.15  
However, his services were turned down as the Egyptian government would not release 
him to join the Liberation Army as they viewed his as a promising officer.  In May 1948, 
the Egyptian government decided to send in the army to help fight alongside the 
                                                 
14 Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab, 18. 
15 Ibid., 23. 
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Palestinians.  Here is when Nasser saw that the British trained and equipment Egyptian 
army was no match for the Western armies.  Nasser blamed this lack of preparedness on 
King Farouk and his “cronies”, who only wanted to profit from the benefits they received 
from the British in return for their loyalty.16  This just furthered the Nasser distaste for 
King Farouk and the British.  After the failure of the Egyptian army in the war, Nasser 
returned to Egypt. 
In 1949, Nasser experienced three events which resulted in him formally forming 
the Free Officer’s Corps.  The first of these events occurred when he was placed on a 
delegation to work out a cease-fire with the Israelis.  This was a humiliating experience to 
Nasser, as he was adamantly opposed to dealing with the Israelis.  Upon returning to 
Egypt, Nasser experienced the second event.  He saw that the Syrian army had 
overthrown the government in Syria and had massive support from the Syrian population.  
This was very impressive to Nasser.  The final event was his interrogation by the 
Egyptian Prime Minister, in front of the Army Chief of Staff, about his political 
activities.  Immediately after the interrogation Nasser turned the loose group of officer 
friends into a formal association named the Association of Free Officers.  Upon its 
creation the members of the association unanimously elected Nasser as the chairman. 
The Free Officer’s Corps started off as a small organization, but membership 
quickly grew.  Even though the exact number is not known, there is speculation that the 
number of members reached anywhere between 90-100 Egyptian officers.17  The Corps 
sponsored underground leaflets that addressed their two main concerns; the British 
presence in Egypt and corruption in the government.18  These concerns resonated with 
many on the Egyptian army and populations.  In the beginning the Free Officer’s Corps 
was not looking to take over the government, but to end the corruption and British 
presence.  This quickly changed in January 1952. 
On January 25, 1952, British forces in the Suez Canal region ordered a police post 
in Ismailia to surrender, as the British thought the post were supporters of anti-British 
group and when the commander of the post refused to surrender the British killed 40 and                                                  
16 Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab, 24. 
17Ibid., 32. 
18 Ibid., 28. 
15 
wounded 70 Egyptian policeman.19  The showing of British brutal force outraged the 
Egyptian population and led to Black Saturday, which was massive protests, looting, and 
burning of foreign businesses in Cairo by the Egyptian population.  The Egyptian 
government did nothing to stop the protest nor did they attempt retribution against the 
British.  This was the final straw to for Nasser and the Free Officer’s Corps.   
By July 22, 1952, army units moved into Cairo and occupied the strategic centers 
and buildings encountering no resistance.20  Once the Free Officer’s Corps had control of 
the city, the Revolutionary Command Council, led by Nasser and General Naquib, took 
control of the government.  Nasser then sent Anwar Sadat and another member of the 
Corps to demand King Farouk abdicate his thrown, which he did.  The Free Officer’s 
Corps had accomplished a bloodless coup that over the next few years led to complete 
British withdrawal from the country.  Initially Nasser shared governmental power with 
General Naguib, but quickly gained complete power as he was more popular and had the 
support of the Egyptian army and population.  This gaining of complete power ascended 
Nasser to the presidency of Egypt, a position he held until 1970. 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
From 1883 to 1952, Egypt experienced many different events that helped shape 
its social and political sectors.  The British goal of maintaining influence and presence 
within the country was countered by the policies that they implemented within Egypt.  
The more they oppressed the Egyptian population, the more the population fought against 
them, and by the time the British decided to ease up on the population it was too late to 
try and satisfy the population.  The Egyptian population was ready for independence and 
willing to fight for it.  Many different groups emerged in Egypt during this time period, 
but there can be no argument that the Free Officer’s Corps was the most successful.  
Nasser and the Free Officer’s Corps rise to power in a bloodless coup in 1952 set the 
stage for Nasser to take Egypt to new heights in the Arab world. 
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III. PAN-ARABISM 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the ideology of pan-Arabism during the beginning and 
mid-twentieth century.  It provides a brief overview of the origins of pan-Arabism, 
outlining reasons why pan-Arabism was important to the countries in the Middle East, 
and considers the emergence of pan-Arabism in Egypt.  The importance of focusing on 
Egypt and pan-Arabism is because, during the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt and its President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser embodied all aspects of pan-Arabism.  During this time period, pan-
Arabism flourished throughout the Arab world and it was Egypt and Nasser that carried 
the torch that allowed pan-Arabism to flourish. 
 
B. DEFINING PAN-ARABISM 
Pan-Arabism is also referred to as Arab Nationalism and Arabism.  Depending on 
the source, different terminologies are used.  None of the prominent scholars can come to 
a consensus as to what the correct term should be.21  The term pan-Arabism may lead 
people to believe that Arabism was spread out over a vast area or region, or it may be 
viewed as a derogatory, by analogy to with similar terms (e.g., “pan-Germanism”) whose 
connotations were explicitly fascist.22  Arab Nationalism and Arabism may lead people to 
believe that nationalism was only in a small region.  The older articles by the prominent 
scholars use the word pan-Arabism throughout the articles, but more recent works have 
shifted to using Arab Nationalism instead.23  There is no reason given for this change, but 
                                                 
21 Lisa Anderson, Rashid Khalidi, Elie Chalala, and Adeed Dawisha are the prominent scholars who 
have written many articles and books discussing the ideology of pan-Arabism / Arab Nationalism.  These 
authors will be referred to frequently throughout this chapter and identified as prominent scholars. 
22 Anne Marie Baylouny, “Politics and Security in the Levant,” Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, September 23, 2006. 
23 The prominent scholar Elie Chalala uses pan-Arabism throughout her article Arab Nationalism: A 
Bibliographic Essay in Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate, ed. Tawfic E. Farah 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), whereas prominent scholars Rashid Khalidi in his article, The Origins 
of Arab Nationalism: Introduction  in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, 
Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991., and Adeed 
Dawisha in his article, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), use Arab Nationalism. 
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I would argue this is due to the fact that the term Arab Nationalism became more 
politically correct and used by Arab leaders during the later half of the twentieth century.  
Throughout this thesis, the term pan-Arabism will be used except when using direct 
quotations.   
Even more problematic then figuring out what word to use is the fact that there is 
no clear definition of pan-Arabism.  Some have assumed that pan-Arabism refers to the 
creation of a single Arab state, an interpretation rejected by prominent scholar Rashid 
Khalidi.24  After examining all the definitions provided by the prominent scholars, a kind 
of minimal consensus is apparent, which holds that pan-Arabism is “the idea that the 
Arabs are people linked by special bonds of language, history and religion, and that their 
political organization should in some way reflect this reality.”25  To this extent pan-
Arabism is an ideological form of nationalism that does have something in common with 
European Nationalism, but with a less intense focus on state-building as such, a view 
affirmed by Adeed Dawisha, whose outlook comes closest to capturing the mainstream 
consensus on this issue.26  
Dawisha states that “pan-Arabism is political unity between the Arab countries in 
the Middle East.”27  This does not mean that the Arab countries should be one state; it 
means that that there is a connection between all Middle Eastern Arabs, both culturally 
and politically.  I would even go so far as to say that pan-Arabism requires Arab states to 
turn to one another for assistance, whether it be economic, social, or political aid rather 
than relying on support from Western governments.  I base this assertion on the fact that 
rise of pan-Arabism was in response to Western influence within the region, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter.   
                                                 
24 Rashid Khalidi, in his article “Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature,” The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 5 (December 1991), 1365-66, dispels the misconception that 
Arab Nationalism refers to the creation of a single Arab state, but rather Arab Nationalism refers to the 
cooperation between Arab countries. 
25 Rashid Khalidi, The Origins of Arab Nationalism: Introduction  in The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), vii. 
26 Rashid Khalidi, “Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature,” The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 96, No. 5 (December 1991), 1364. 
27 Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 4. 
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Both the combination of Adeed Dawisha’s definition and my view, as to the meaning of 
pan-Arabism, will be used to define pan-Arabism within this thesis. 
Dawisha goes on to prove the connection between Arab states by using the works 
of two prominent scholars; Sato’ al-Husri and Bernard Lewis.  Dawisha points out that 
the prominent theoretician of Arab Nationalism, Sato’ al-Husri, stated “people who speak 
a unitary language have a one heart and a common soul.  As such they constitute one 
nation, and so they have to have a unified state.”28  This statement gives the impression 
that all Arabs are connected through their common culture and that connection should 
lead to cooperation in politics.  Dawisha further goes on to show that even prominent 
scholar Bernard Lewis agrees with the statement put forth by al-Husri.  As Lewis states, 
“a nation denotes a group of people held together by a common language, belief in 
descent, and in a shared history and destiny.”29 
Pan-Arabism connects all Arabs regardless of where they are geographically.  
What makes pan-Arabism transnational is its ability to connect Arab culture to the 
political structure of the vast Arab countries.  This can largely been seen in the origins of 
pan-Arabism and the specific countries that really had a grasp on the ideology. 
 
C. ORIGINS OF PAN-ARABISM 
As with the definition of pan-Arabism, there is no consensus as to the origins of 
this ideology.  Two main factors are at the root of this lack of consensus, when and where 
the ideology of pan-Arabism began.  There are three main schools of thought, which 
assign the origins of pan-Arabism respectively to the later years of the Ottoman Empire, 
to the Interwar period, and to the years following World War II.  After examining the 
writings of all of various scholars in these different schools of thought, I would argue that 
                                                 
28 Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 2, quoting Sati` Abu Khaldun al-Husri, What is nationalism?: enquires 
and studies in light of events and theories (Beruit: Dar al`Ilm li al-Malayeen, 1963), 57. 
29 Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 6, quoting Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1998), 81. 
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the initial stages of pan-Arabism began during the Ottoman Empire, but the ideology did 
not flourish in the region until after World War II. 
Scholar George Antonius traces the origins of pan-Arabism to the Wahhabi 
movement and Muhammad Ali.30  Both the movement and the rule of Muhammad Ali 
began during the Ottoman Empire.  Because the Ottoman Empire was so diverse and vast 
there was no common cause with which to unite society.  The rulers of this empire 
wanted a united society, so they implemented reforms that would allow people to gain a 
sense of who and what they were.  These reforms occurred during the time period 
commonly referred to as the tanzimat.  During the tanzimat, the rulers of the Ottoman 
Empire sought to create a Turkish identity through nationalism and force that identity 
onto the Arab populations of the empire.31  This was unsuccessful as the Arab 
populations, following their religious leaders, revolted against this forced identity and 
turned to their history and culture for their own Arab identity. This resulted in the initial 
stages of pan-Arabism.  As scholar C. Ernest Dawn states, “Arab nationalism arose as an 
opposition movement in the Ottoman Empire.”32   
During this period in time, the Arab populations of the Ottoman Empire were able 
to unite behind the religion of Islam and further identified with one another as Arabs.  
There was heavy reliance on religion and Arab culture to stimulate an Arab identity.  It 
can be concluded that this heavy reliance is connected to the Islamic modernization 
occurring during this period of time.  Islamic modernization came about in response to a 
desire by Arab populations to curtail the increasing Western influence in the region.  It 
was the Arab population’s way of re-defining their existence based on Islam and Arab 
culture rather than the ideas Western governments were trying to introduce to them.  The 
lack of identity is further argued by Mahmoud Haddad, who states that “there was a 
cultural crisis of self-view in relation to the power of Western influence.”33   
                                                 
30 Elie Chalala, Arab Nationalism: A Bibliographic Essay in Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The 
Continuing Debate, ed. Tawfic E. Farah (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), 22. 
31 Khalidi, The Origins of Arab Nationalism: Introduction in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, x. 
32 C. Ernest Dawn, Origins of Arab Nationalism in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, ed. Rashid 
Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991), 23. 
33 Mahmoud Haddad, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, Vol. 26, No 2 (May 1994), 202. 
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Understanding the cultural crisis, scholar George Antonius further argues that the 
Egyptian Pasha Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha, although, ironically, of 
Macedonian descent, had a clear view of an Arab identity.34  They used this view during 
the cultural crisis to be able to define a common Arab identity, resulting in the 
furtherance of the ideology of pan-Arabism.  They were able to use their positions as 
leaders of Arab territories (Egypt and Syria) under Turkish rule to influence the 
populations.   As he states, “Ibrahim stated that he is not a Turk and the sun of Egypt 
changed his blood to Arab.”35  While these individuals were instrumental in beginning 
the ideology of pan-Arabism, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that pan-Arabism 
really took off in the region.   
There are two main regions of the Middle East where pan-Arabism is claimed to 
have begun, Egypt and Greater Syria.  This makes sense since Muhammad Ali and 
Ibrahim Pasha were the rulers of Egypt and Greater Syria, respectively, and these 
countries were considered intellectual centers of the Arab Middle East.  The pan-Arabism 
movement in these regions was vital to the spread of the ideology.  Both countries used 
the pan-Arabism movement in a number of societal groups and associations to advance 
its cause.36  In Greater Syria, Ibrahim Pasha used the ideology of pan-Arabism to unite 
the Christians and the Muslims against the Ottoman Empire.  Rather than using religion 
as the pre-text for confrontation, he used the idea of the Arabs fighting against the rule of 
the Turks.37  In order to gain independence from Britain Muhammad Ali used the 
ideology of pan-Arabism to unite the Egyptian population against British occupation. 
 
D. IMPORTANCE OF PAN-ARABISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The importance of pan-Arabism to the countries in the Middle East can be seen by 
examining how it was viewed by the leaders of those countries and their respective 
                                                 
34 Chalala, Arab Nationalism: A Bibliographic Essay in Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The 
Continuing Debate, 23. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Haddad, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered,” 202. 
37 Chalala, Arab Nationalism: A Bibliographic Essay in Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The 
Continuing Debate, 23. 
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populations.  To the populations of the Middle East, pan-Arabism represented an 
expression of society.  The ideology of pan-Arabism combined all aspects of the Arab 
culture.  This included language, religion, art, and politics.  It gave the Arab Middle East 
populations a sense that they were connected to one another.  This was concept was 
extremely important to the populations during the mid-twentieth century.  During this 
time period, the region was beginning to be de-colonized by the European powers and the 
people of the region needed something to bring them together.  They turned to pan-
Arabism to be able to accomplish this.  As Rashid Khalidi stated, “pan-Arabism has had a 
powerful impact on the intellectual and popular currents in the Arab world.”38  He further 
goes on to argue that there was a vacuum created by the de-colonization of the region that 
resulted in a weakening of the population.  He claims that much of this weakness was 
caused by the fragmentation of the Arab world by the European imperialist powers and 
their policies of portioning off countries in the region to serve their own interests.39  The 
main goal of the European Imperial powers was to keep the population of the region from 
uniting and ultimately threatening European interests.  These statements alone should 
give a sense of how the populations of the Arab countries felt and the need for them to be 
able to unite and connect with something to provide them a sense of being. 
Khalidi goes on to explain that the cultural aspects of pan-Arabism made it so 
appealing to Arabs in the Middle East.  As he writes, “Arab Nationalism represented both 
a revival of old traditions and loyalties and a creation of new myths based on them.”40  
This caused the literature and language of Arabs to take on a new and heightened 
importance, which resulted in a sense of pride for Arab populations.41  This sense of 
pride and importance of literature and language was something populations of the Arab 
world had not been able to experience during the Ottoman Empire or the colonial rule of 
the region.  For the first time, they were able to understand what it meant to be Arab.  
This new found sense of pride and importance forced leaders of Arab countries to re-
think how they would govern their countries. 
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39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 1365. 
41 Ibid. 
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Adeed Dawisha places this new way of governing in context.  He argues that 
leaders in the Middle East must work, or at least appear to the population to be working, 
to achieve the goals of the new value system of pan-Arabism.  If the leader is unable or 
unwilling to accomplish this task, then there is no guarantee that they will be able to 
survive in the political system in the Middle East.42  Furthermore Dawisha sees four main 
goals that a leader in the Arab world must meet in this new way of governing; proper 
observance of Islam, pursuit of Arab unity, expulsion of foreign influence, and progress 
and social justice.43  The main leaders to be able to accomplish these goals were the 
leaders of the military coups and revolutions of the 1950s.  As Barry Rubin states, “these 
military coups leaders argued that Arabs had to fight the West and made big promises for 
the efficacy of anti-imperialism, revolution, Arab socialism, and activist pan-Arabism.”44  
The main leader to champion these goals was Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. 
 
E. EMERGENCE OF PAN-ARABISM IN EGYPT 
While it is true that Nasser championed the pan-Arabist cause both in Egypt and 
throughout the Middle East, it is important to note that pan-Arabism was already part of 
Egyptian society prior to Nasser coming to power.  It is also essential to understand how 
and when the ideology of pan-Arabism first emerged in Egypt.  Most of the prominent 
scholars that write on this subject agree that the emergence of pan-Arabism in Egypt 
began in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  During the mid-twentieth century, Egypt 
embodied the ideals and culture that made up the ideology of pan-Arabism.  Author 
Ralph Coury attributes this emergence to the ruling class in Egypt.  In his article, Who 
Invented Egyptian Arab Nationalism? Part 2, he argues that there was growing interest in 
various forms of Arab unity and cooperation among the different branches of the 
                                                 
42 Barry Rubin, “Pan-Arab Nationalism: The Ideological Dream as Compelling Force,” Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 26, No ¾, The Impact of Western Nationalism: Essays Dedicated to Walter Z. 
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Egyptian ruling class and this was reflected in the political and socioeconomic 
developments with in the country.45  Much of the ruling class felt that Egypt was far 
ahead, in these aspects, of other Middle Eastern countries and could use this to their 
advantage to spread the ideals of pan-Arabism.  In order to accomplish this, the press and 
leaders of various parties called for the strengthening of economic and cultural ties with 
other countries in the Middle East.46 
Within Egyptian society itself there was a transition occurring to make the 
country more self-consciously Arab.  During this time period, along with the emergence 
of the pan-Arabist ideology, Egyptians were searching for a national identity.  Many 
Egyptian scholars advocated that as Egyptians, there was a connection between their 
Arab brothers.  They believed that as long as the people of the Arab world spoke the 
same language and shared the same cultural ties they were united as one.47  By 
advocating this understanding, the scholars forced into the minds of the Egyptian 
population that they were Arab and they should take a sense of pride in the culture that 
makes them Arab.  As Egyptians began to grasp the idea of being Arab, there was a rise 
in the thinking of the need for Arab unity and that Egypt was the natural leader of that 
unity.   
Specifically, many politicians felt that Egypt was looked upon as a leader and 
savior by the Arab world because of its struggle against Western Imperialism.48  Many 
leaders and people within the Arab Middle East felt that Egypt could lead and help them 
with their own struggle against Western Imperialism.  Even the Egyptian Communist 
Party added a clause in its’ program in 1931 “calling for struggle on behalf of all Arab 
peoples from imperialism, as well as the achievement of a complete Arab unity that 
included all free Arabs.”49 This is the first time that we begin to see the idea of Egypt 
leading the Arab world resonate from Egyptian politicians and society.  This new idea 
was furthered during the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
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Nasser was the leader in the Arab Middle East who championed and “carried the 
torch” through the 1950s and 1960s of pan-Arabism.50  As Elie Chalala stated, “he was 
the most important leader for popularizing the idea of Arab Nationalism.”51  Nasser 
understood and used Egypt’s size and strategic importance in the Arab world to spread 
his idea of pan-Arabism.  This idea of strategic importance was further emphasized by 
the statement of scholar Israel Gershoni that “Egypt’s unique virtues, geopolitical 
features, cultural advantages, and spiritual and religious power destine Egypt to bear the 
crown of all Arab leadership and oblige it to fulfill its pan-Arab mission.”52  To Nasser 
being Arab was more than just a cultural identity; he viewed it as an ability to influence 
other countries in the Middle East. 
Many of Nasser’s speeches and much of his public rhetoric took on the tone of 
pan-Arabism.  During addresses he gave, he always referred to Egypt as an Arab country, 
Arab Egypt, or a member of the great Arab entity.  Specifically in July 1954 during a 
radio address on the first anniversary of the launching of Voice of the Arabs, Nasser 
referred to Arabs as “one nation” and placed Egypt within that nation.53  The idea of 
Egypt being part of the Arab entity was furthered by Nasser, in the national charter he 
authored in 1962, when he referred to the “Arab people of Egypt” and asserted that “there 
is no conflict whatsoever between Egyptian patriotism and Arab Nationalism.”54   
Throughout his presidency, Nasser’s speeches continued to evoke the pan-Arabist 
ideology and resonated with the Arab population in the Middle East.  In his speeches he 
drilled into the minds of the Arab population of the region the idea that Arab cooperation 
and unity was needed for defense against the Western powers and for the benefit of other 
Arabs.55  In a speech given in July 1957, Nasser stated that, “Arab nationalism is a 
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weapon for every Arab state.  Arab nationalism is a weapon employed against 
aggression.  It is necessary for the aggressor to know that, if he aggresses against any 
Arab country, he will endanger his interests.”56  Nasser was able to use the support and 
popularity he received from these statements to further Egypt’s Arabist role in the Arab 
Middle East.  This can be seen by examining Nasser’s domestic and foreign policies; 
which will be done in Chapter IV. 
It should now be clear how Egypt, as a state, and Nasser, as a leader, were able to 
“shape and ride the wave” of pan-Arabism in order to spread the ideology throughout the 
Middle East and influence the other countries in the region. 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Throughout the history of the Middle East there has been a contention that the 
Arab Middle East countries have not been able to unite behind a common idea or cause.  
The purpose of this chapter was to dispel that contention.  It is quite clear that during the 
late nineteenth century and for the majority of the twentieth century the countries and the 
populations were able to unite behind the ideology of pan-Arabism.  While the unity did 
not last for a long period of time, it did have a profound effect on how leaders in this part 
of the world governed and related to their populations.   The other purpose of this chapter 
was to give an understanding that there is no consensus on the definition and origin of 
pan-Arabism.  It is difficult to explain this phenomenon when the prominent scholars can 
not come to a consensus.  However, what should be clear is that the ideology of pan-
Arabism did promote the cooperation and unity of all Arab people and that it was in 
response to the continued Western influence in the region.  Pan-Arabism was the Arab 
population’s way of uniting against the West and ultimately forcing them out of the 
region. 
 
                                                 
56 Jankowski, Arab Nationalism in “Nasserism” and Egyptian State Policy, 1952-1958 in Rethinking 
Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, 155. 
27 
IV. RISE OF EGYPT FROM 1952 TO 1967 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Egypt’s rise in power and influence within the Arab Middle East came about 
during the Presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser.  As discussed at the end of Chapter II, 
Nasser took the ideology of pan-Arabism to vault Egypt to the position of leadership 
within the region.  Nasser used this ideology to enact certain domestic and foreign 
policies that would allow Egypt to fulfill its regional power role that both he and the 
population of Egypt believed was their inherent right.  On the domestic side, Nasser 
concentrated on the social, political, and economic policies of the country to made Egypt 
strong domestically.  On the foreign policy side, Nasser turned to a position of neutralism 
when it came to dealing with the West and the Soviet Union and increased Egypt’s 
connection to the other countries with the Arab Middle East.  The purpose of this chapter 
is to further discuss, in detail, the domestic and foreign policies of Nasser and their 
connection to pan-Arabism in order to better understand Egypt’s rise in power and 
influence in the Arab Middle East. 
 
B. GEOGRAPHY 
Egypt’s internal geography and geographic location has had a great importance to 
the country throughout its history.  Egypt’s internal geography has made it very attractive 
to external powers.  This attractiveness is due to two reasons; firstly, Egypt’s fertile soil 
along the Nile River and within the Nile Valley has allowed for many “cash crops” to be 
grown and exported throughout the world and secondly, the long coastline and Nile Delta 
ports along the Mediterranean Sea allows Egypt to be connected to the Mediterranean 
countries.57  This can largely be seen by the French and British interests in the country 
within the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  In regards to its geographic 
location, Egypt is strategically located between the continents of Africa and Asia with the 
Sinai Peninsula as the bridge between the two continents (see Figure 1).58   
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The various leaders of Egypt have been able to use this location to allow Egypt to 
have connection with both the West and the Middle East.  This connection includes both 
trade and political alignments.  President Nasser understood the geographic importance of 
Egypt not only to West, but also its ability to strengthen Egypt’s leadership role in the 
Arab Middle East.  The ideology of pan-Arabism helped to strengthen the importance of 
Egypt’s geographic location to the other countries of the Arab Middle East.  Egypt’s 
location provides it with the waterways that connect the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Indian Ocean.  The Suez Canal, which serves as a passage from the Mediterranean Sea to 
the Indian Ocean, provides Egypt the opportunity to control the flow of traffic to and 
from these bodies of water.  This makes Egypt strategically important to countries that 
use international trade routes.  Egypt’s geographic location also allowed it to take 
advantage of the European industrial revolution to harness Egyptian domestic power and 
then take that power to influence and ultimately lead the Arab Middle East.  Much of this 





Figure 1.   Map of Egypt (From: CRS Report for Congress – Egypt: Background and 
U.S. Relations)59 
 
C. DOMESTIC  POLICIES 
In 1952, when Nasser ascended to the Egyptian Presidency, he understood that in 
order for Egypt to fulfill its position as the leader of the Arab Middle East, as prescribed 
by the pan-Arabist ideology, it must first have a strong domestic society before he could 
turn his attention to establishing the country in intra-Arab politics and in the international 
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arena.  In order to bring about this internal strength Nasser implemented social and 
economic policies designed to unite the country behind his leadership and “to harness the 
resources of Egypt to mobilize the potential power of the country.”60  As many leaders 
understand, a country united behind their leader is very strong and Nasser was no 
exception to this understanding.  The social policies which Nasser introduced included 
the banning of political parties, the outlawing of radical social groups that did not support 
him or the government, the introduction of the social contract, and changes in the 
economic sector. 
The banning of political parties was one of the first social policies Nasser 
undertook.  When Nasser became president, he immediately implemented policies to 
centralize power within the presidency and outlaw any political parties which did not 
share the same views as he had.  By 1962, Nasser established the first mass political party 
within Egypt, which was called the Arab Socialist Union or ASU.  This party was viewed 
as an extension of the current ruling class since the party later became the National 
Democratic Party or NDP.61  The NDP is the current ruling political party in Egypt of 
which both President Sadat and President Mubarak are members.  By outlawing all 
political parties and establishing his own, Nasser accomplished his goal of eliminating 
most political and social opposition to his policies thus resulting in the beginning of a 
united domestic society.  To completely eliminate all political and social opposition, 
Nasser turned his attention to eliminating or outlawing the radical social groups within 
Egypt. 
With regards to the outlawing of radical social groups within Egypt, the main 
group that was a threat to Nasser’s vision of a united Egyptian society was the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  During the first three years of Nasser’s presidency there was a spirit of 
cooperation and tolerance between the government and the Brotherhood.  This 
cooperation and tolerance began during the Egyptian struggle for independence.  The 
Muslim Brotherhood’s and the Free Officer’s Corps shared a common goal during that 
struggle, which was Egyptian independence from the British.   
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Once that independence had been achieved, however, the goals of the new Egyptian 
government, led by Nasser, and the Muslim Brotherhood diverged.   
The main difference in goals was that the Muslim Brotherhood wanted Egypt to 
become an Islamic state and Nasser did not.  By 1954, this difference led to the end of 
cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government and the attempted 
assassination of Nasser by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Nasser immediately 
disbanded the group and imprisoned its leaders and members. 62 For the rest of Nasser’s 
presidency, the members of Brotherhood who were not permanently imprisoned were the 
subject of brutal oppression by the government, to include police beatings, repeated 
arrest, harassment, and torture.63  With the radical social groups disbanded Nasser was 
able to focus his attention on the social needs of Egyptian population, through his social 
contract. 
Nasser’s social contract entailed providing social services to the population in 
return for their political support.64  Under the social contract the social services provided 
to the Egyptian population included health care services, food and clothing subsides, 
education, rent control, and low cost housing.  This social contract proved to be a huge 
success for Nasser and Egypt’s ability to become domestically strong.  This social 
contract was well received by the Egyptian population.  They now had access to services 
previously unavailable to them during the British Occupation.  Specifically the health 
care services in Egypt increased.  The number of Egyptian citizens was overwhelming to 
the health care system established by the British and not all citizens had access or could 
afford these services.  Nasser’s goal was to provide, at a minimum, basic health care 
services to all Egyptian citizens.  To accomplish this he increased funding of the health 
care system and the Ministry of Public Health.  This increase in funds led to successful 
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results and between 1952 and 1956 the number of registered doctors increased from 4470 
to 6420 and the number of medical facilities increased by 10 percent.65  
Nasser’s education reform was also a great social policy achievement.   There was 
considerable funding placed in the education system of the country.  The British, during 
the occupation, helped to build primary schools for children, so Nasser’s objective was 
expand the number of primary school and build secondary schools in the country.  
Between 1955 and 1964 approximately 4000 primary schools were constructed 
throughout Egypt; most of them in urban centers.66  These new schools allowed for all 
children between the ages of 6 and 12 the ability to attend primary school.  With this 
basic education, Nasser’s hope was that the population would enter to work force and 
participate actively in the economic sector; thus making Egypt stronger.   
With regards to secondary education, Nasser’s hope was that providing secondary 
education to the Egyptian population would increase the number of people in professional 
fields; this would in turn make the domestic society and economy stronger.  Nasser 
increased the funding to universities and secondary schools.  With this increase in 
funding more people were allowed to attend these schools and at any point in time 
approximately 100,000 people attended the four universities around the country.67  The 
ability to receive secondary education allowed the middle and lower class citizens the 
ability to expand into more lucrative jobs in the public sectors, which is exactly what 
Nasser had hoped.    Most of these lucrative jobs were in the professional field, i.e., 
doctors, lawyers, and engineers. 
While these new policies were successful in strengthening Egyptian society, it did 
place a heavy financial burden on the economy.  When Nasser came to power in Egypt 
the country was already overpopulated, in a large amount of debt, due to British 
occupation policies, and these news social policies did nothing to correct this problem.  
The large population placed heavy demand on governmental services.68  Nasser 
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implemented domestic economic reforms in order to be able to afford the financial 
burden of his social contract and in keeping with the pan-Arabist ideology.  Nasser turned 
to and relied more on Egypt’s internal economic sectors to increase the country’s revenue 
rather than relying only on external financial assistance, which is what the pan-Arabist 
ideology would require.  Basically Nasser’s economic policies were based on keeping the 
economy closed off from the free market and having state control over the economy. 
One of the first economic reforms that Nasser implemented was the 
nationalization of all Egypt’s privately owned banks and commercial businesses.  This 
was in keeping with Nasser’s policy of having state control over the Egyptian economy.  
The reforms were designed to be a source of domestic revenue for the country, rather 
than those revenues going to Britain or France.  This nationalization of private business 
continued throughout Nasser’s presidency and expanded to include insurance companies 
and industrial companies.  This ultimately resulted in the expulsion of all British and 
French influence within the country, and was in accordance with the pan-Arabist 
ideology.  This first step in reforming Egypt’s economic sector was successful, but it did 
not create the necessary amount of revenue needed to afford the social contract and other 
domestic policies.  To gain additional sources of domestic revenue, Nasser turned his 
attention to other reforms in agriculture and industry.  
The second economic reform Nasser implemented was the Agrarian Reform Law 
of 1952.  This new law limited the amount of land and individual could hold to 200 acres.  
The law required that if someone owed more land than that, the excess land had to be 
sold to the state at a certain tax assessment and then the state would sell it, at a low price, 
to individuals that did not own land.69  By 1961, the number of acres an individual could 
own was lowered to 100, making more land available to be purchased by peasants.  The 
law basically evened out the amount of arable land among the Egyptian population to 
allow them to set up a place to live and grow crops for income.  By enabling more of the 
population to own land, Nasser allowed the state to not only collect more tax revenue, but  
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it also allowed the population to increase the amount of money they could spend on 
goods.  This increase in income from the harvesting and selling of crops allowed the 
population of Egypt to participate more in the economy.   
Along the lines of the agricultural sector was the building of the Aswan High 
Dam and the nationalization of the Suez Canal.  Both of these projects were meant to 
support and grow the economy.  The Aswan High Dam was built to make irrigation more 
available to the farmers in Egypt; thus allowing more crops to be grown and harvested.  
To pay for the dam Nasser initially turned to the United States and the World Bank for 
assistance, but ultimately nationalized the Suez Canal.  By nationalizing the Suez Canal 
Nasser created another source of tax revenue for the country.  This new tax revenue was 
not only used for the building costs of the dam, but also in helping support the public 
spending of the government.  The nationalization of the Suez Canal did have foreign 
policy consequences that are discussed later in this chapter.   
Another economic reform that Nasser implemented was in the field of industry.  
Heavy industrialization of the country was a result of the Five-Year Development Plan 
implemented in 1960.  Even before the plan was created, Egypt was the most 
industrialized country in the Arab Middle East.  The country had a large textile industry, 
modern banking structure, commerce, transportation system, and communication 
system.70  This industrialization can be attributed to some of the reforms and laws that 
were implemented during the British Occupation.  Nasser took the already established 
industrial sector and expanded it.  Between 1952 and 1959 the amount of industrial 
production increased by 47 percent.71   
As a result of the Five-Year Development Plan, the Egyptian government 
increased the amount of public funding of new industries to 1.7 billion Egyptian Lire.  
While most of these industries had a connection to the agricultural sector of the Egyptian 
economy there were other sectors in which public funds where invested; these included 
transportation, communications, housing, and electricity.72  The hope was that the Five-
Year Development Plan would raise the national income 40 percent by 1965 and another                                                  
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40 percent by 1970.  While this was by no means unrealistic it took more time than 
anticipated for each of the sectors to begin showing a return.  There was only modest 
growth, 15-20 percent, between 1960 and 1970.  These new economic policies of Nasser 
did accomplish what he wanted of being able to support his new social policies.  While 
these economic policies were successful, Egypt did receive external aid from the West 
and the Soviet Union. 
Between 1952 and 1967, Egypt was receiving financial assistance from the United 
States in the form of development assistance, economic support fund, and the food for 
peace program (P.L. 480).  Table 1 shows the amount of assistance Egypt received from 
















1952 0 0.4 0 0 0.8 1.2 
1953 0 12.9 0 0  12.9 
1954 0 3.3 0 0 0.7 4 
1955 7.5 35.3 0 0 23.5 66.3 
1956 0 2.6 0 13.2 17.5 33.3 
1957 0 0.7 0 0 0.3 1 
1958 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 
1959 0 2 0 33.9 8.9 44.8 
1960 15.4 5.7 0 36.6 8.2 65.9 
1961 0 2.3 0 48.6 22.6 73.5 
1962 20 2.2 20 114 44.3 200.5 
1963 36.3 2.3 10 78.5 19.6 146.7 
1964 0 1.4 0 85.2 8.9 95.5 
1965 0 2.3 0 84.9 10.4 97.6 
1966 0 1.5 0 16.4 9.7 27.6 
1967 0 0.8 0 0 11.8 12.6 
 
Table 1.   U.S. aid to Egypt 1952-1967 [$Mil] (From: CRS Report for Congress – 
Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations)73  
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As shown in the Table 1, Egypt received large amounts of foreign assistance in 
the years leading up to the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.  It can be 
argued that the United States was hoping this increase in foreign assistance would 
influence Nasser to change his policies towards the West.  Even with this large amount of 
foreign assistance, Nasser did not allow it to influence decision making process with 
regards to domestic and foreign policies nor did he allow it to influence his relationship  
with the West or with the countries within the Arab Middle East, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  This refusal to allow western influence was in keeping with the pan-
Arabist ideology of not allowing foreign powers to control your policies.  Nasser 
understood that he needed to use some of the newly acquired national revenue to fund a 
strong military to enforce his policies, keep the country stable, and project Egypt’s 
powerful Arab position to the West. 
Nasser’s budget for the military increased drastically over his time as president.  
In 1958, Egypt spent $211 million on defense and by 1968 that budget increased to 
$506.9 million, much more than any other country in the region was spending.74  For 
example, Iraqi defense spending was $83.5 million in 1958 and $253.9 million in 1968.75  
You can see the importance of the military based on the amount of money spent on the 
military by the government.  To balance the foreign assistance Egypt was receiving from 
the West and to stay neutral, Nasser turned to the Soviet Bloc for military assistance.  He 
signed numerous arms deals with the Soviet Union and the Czech Republic.   
In 1957, Egypt received Soviet made tanks, MiG-17 jets, and other arms for the 
army worth approximately $150 million.76  This deal was small compared to the arms 
deal Egypt signed with the Soviet Union in 1963.  The 1963 arms deal called for more 
military cooperation between the two countries and also provided Egypt top-of-the-line 
weaponry worth approximately $220 million; specifically MiG-21 jets, T-54/55 tank, 
TU-16 bomber, surface-to-air missiles, and guided missiles patrol boats.77  Between 1955 
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and 1966 Egyptian-Soviet arms deals totaled approximately $1.19 Billion.78  All of these 
arms deals gave Egypt access to new military technology that other countries in the Arab 
Middle East did not have.  With this increase in military spending and arms deals, 
Egypt’s military become the most advanced and powerful of all the Arab countries and 
helped to make Egypt a regional power as prescribed by the pan-Arabist ideology. 
Nasser understood that changing Egyptian domestic policies was only a start to 
making Egypt a regional power and leader of the Arab Middle East.  Nasser also 
understood that Egyptian foreign policy was extremely important to advancing those 
roles and making the country the leader in the Arab Middle East.  He understood that 
there was a connection between Egypt’s foreign and domestic policies.  Nasser stated at 
an opening cabinet meeting that “our foreign policy is in service to our internal policy.”79 
With this idea in mind, Nasser turned his attention to the increasing his relations with the 
other countries in the Arab Middle East. 
 
D. FOREIGN POLICIES 
At the beginning of his presidency, Nasser had two policies concerning foreign 
relations; the first being not getting too involved in intra-Arab problems or relations and 
the second being a position of neutralism between the West and the Soviet Union.  He 
just believed that Egypt was the country that should unify and led all of the Arab 
countries.  His mindset changed as Western governments became more and more 
involved in intra-Arab relations.  Nasser was skeptical of the West’s intentions and 
viewed their continued influence in the region as a threat to Arab unity as prescribed by 
the pan-Arabism ideology.  Nasser wanted to distance Egypt and the other Arab countries 
from the Western powers.  To begin to accomplish this, in July 1954 the radio program 
“Voice of the Arabs” was established by Nasser.80  This program, broadcasted to many of 
the Arab countries within the Middle East, discussed Arab issues and concerns about 
Western influence within the region.   
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Nasser also increased the circulation of Egyptian newspapers to Arab countries, 
specifically Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.  Both the radio program and the increase in 
newspaper circulation allowed Egypt to inform the Arab Middle East population and in 
some ways influence their Arab issues of concern.  Nasser furthered his interest in a 
unified Arab world by obtaining the concurrence of the members of the Arab League for 
a resolution calling for greater Arab cooperation in January 1954.81  All of these actions 
by Nasser were an attempt to limit Western influence within the region, but more 
concrete action was going to take place in 1955.   
In 1955, Iraq signed a defense pact with Turkey and the West, referred to as the 
Baghdad Pact, which many Arab leaders viewed as a cementation of Western influence 
within the region.  Nasser viewed the signing of this pact as a threat to his goal of Arab 
unity and cooperation with Egypt as the leader and the signing of the pact resulted in a 
shift in Egyptian foreign policy in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was less 
interested than the West in exerting direct economic influence within the region, which 
appealed to the leaders of the Arab Middle East.  Adeed Dawisha has gone so far as to 
claim that the signing of the Baghdad Pact “compelled Nasser and Egypt to fully enter, 
participate in, and then dominate the regional politics of the Arab Middle East.”82  Even 
before the signing of the pact, however, Nasser clearly viewed the negotiations behind it 
as a threat to Egypt’s position within the region.   
Even before the Pact had been signed, Nasser pushed the members of the Arab 
league to strengthen the Arab Collective Security Pact in the hopes of countering Western 
influence.  Nasser’s position on this Security Pact was “the Arab Collective Security Pact 
is the only vehicle which Egypt and the Arab countries consider effective for the defense 
of the Arab world.”83  Nasser was able to convince the Arab countries to strengthen the 
Security Pact, even with the interference of the West.  Officials from Western 
governments threatened to isolate Egypt, and the other Arab Middle East countries 
signing onto the Security Pact, from the international community unless non-Arab states 
were able to join the pact.  In a press interview given in May 1954, Nasser stated that “the 
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ties that bind the Arabs together will grow stronger and stronger no matter how hard our 
enemies attempt to break them.84  This interference by the West further fueled Nasser’s 
concern about Western influence with the region, but the final breaking point of Egypt’s 
position of neutrality and tolerance of the West was over the financing of the Aswan 
High Dam and the Suez Crisis. 
The Suez Crisis was centered on Nasser nationalizing the Suez Canal in order to 
pay for the construction of the Aswan High Dam.  The Aswan High Dam project was 
essential to the agricultural industry in the country.85  Nasser turned to the World Bank to 
help fund the construction of the new dam.  The United States agreed to loan Egypt the 
funding with certain stipulations, but later withdrew the funding as a consequence of 
Egypt’s adopting a series of  anti-West positions, including its recognition of Communist 
China, its assistance of Algerian rebels against the French, and Nasser’s general public 
scolding of the West “in the name of Arab Nationalism.”86  The Soviet Union then 
agreed to help Egypt build the dam with no stipulations, but requested to send military 
representatives to the country to start military dialogue between the two countries.87  In 
order to offset the cost of building the dam, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.   
Although the Canal was incontestably sovereign Egyptian territory, it was 
operated by private French and the British firms, who along with their governments had 
financed its construction in the nineteenth century.  By nationalizing the canal, Nasser 
would be able to place a tax on the ships using the canal, which could then used to 
finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam and other projects.  The nationalization 
of the dam led to Suez Crisis, an open conflict between the Egyptians, British, French, 
and Israeli’s, from which the Egyptians emerged largely unscathed thanks to the 
intervention of the United States, which was deeply affronted by the unilateralism of is 
European allies, which had failed to consult Washington before undertaking the violent 
overthrow of Nasser’s government 
                                                 
84 Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic, 60. 
85 Wheelock, Nasser’s New Egypt: A Critical Analysis, 173. 
86 Ibid., 195. 
87 Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984, 46-47. 
40 
Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal and his apparent triumph in the Suez 
Crisis gave him instant creditability and earned support for Egypt throughout the Arab 
Middle East.  When Nasser nationalized the canal, “many countries in the Arab Middle 
East sent letters of support and congratulations to Egypt.  Even the Council of the League 
of Arab States declared the solidarity of Arab governments with Egypt.”88  This 
solidarity was seen in the type of support Egypt received from the Arab countries.  Syria 
and Jordan offered military support to Egypt to fight against the British, French, and 
Israelis, and Saudi Arabia suspended oil shipments to Britain and France.89  The Egyptian 
victory also lifted Egypt to the Arab Middle East leadership role.  Egypt had 
accomplished something that no other country in the region had been able to do; it had 
openly defied a combination of Western powers and come out on top.  The Egyptian 
victory also resulted in Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan signing a new Arab 
Solidarity Pact in January 1957, which reaffirmed their commitment to intra-Arab 
cooperation.90  By the other Arab countries displaying support and solidarity for Egypt 
and each other they embodied the key concept of pan-Arabism; which is Arab unity. 
Egypt’s leadership role of the Arab Middle East was further solidified by the 
creation of the United Arab Republic or UAR.  The UAR was an alliance formed 
between Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961.  The formation of the UAR was another 
example of how Egypt embodied the concept of Arab unity and pan-Arabism.  Syria 
approached Egypt to form this union after the Syrian government felt there would be a 
possible overthrow of the government by the Syrian military and Ba’ath party.  The 
creation of the UAR helped Nasser spread his idea of a one Arab region under Egypt’s 
leadership.  Even as early as 1956, Nasser made public statements of unity between 
Egypt and Syria.  Specifically during his Suez Canal Nationalization speech given on 
July 26, 1956, Nasser referred to Egypt and Syria as “one country”.91   
Upon the formation of this union, Syria was placed under Egyptian policies and 
law and Cairo was named the capital of the union.  Although the union only lasted until 
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1961 it further strengthened the emerging consensus that Egypt was the regional power 
and leader of the Arab Middle East.  As author Kerr wrote, Nasser blamed the early 
breakup of the UAR on compromising with too many “reactionaries”.  Afterwards he 
went on to state that Egypt would unify and collaborate with other countries in the Arab 
Middle East that held the same values as Egypt.92  From 1961 until 1967, Nasser used the 
newfound Arab leadership to attempt to destabilize pro-Western governments in 
Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan, and supported Palestinian actions against Israel.93   Nasser 
also intervened in the Yemeni Civil War, which resulted in a short term union of Yemen 
and Egypt known as United Arab States or UAS.  By 1967 Egyptian power and Arab 
leadership was going to be tested in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. 
The Israeli expansion into Arab territories forced the Arab countries within the 
region to on the defensive to protect their sovereign territory.  In May 1967 Nasser 
ordered Egyptian forces into the Sinai Peninsula to protect Egypt, forced out the United 
Nation peacekeepers, and threatened to close the Straits of Tiran which would have 
resulted in  the cutting off of shipments of goods to Israel.94  It is unlikely that Nasser 
sought an open war or conflict with Israel, but the need to continue Egypt’s role as the 
leader of the Arab Middle East, and chose this confrontation as a means to accomplish 
that, by rallying surrounding states under Egypt’s military umbrella.  Nasser was hoping 
that this new crisis would result in another political victory like the one he experienced 
after the Suez Crisis.  He apparently believed that these actions would cause Israel to 
rethink it arrogant outlook toward its Arab neighbors, without the need actually to use 
force.  
Prior to the war beginning in June 1967, Egypt worked with both Syria and 
Jordan to amass a large enough military force, led by Egypt, to defend the Arab countries 
from Israeli attack.  Nasser believed that should Israel go to war with the Arabs, the 
Israeli military would be no match for an Egyptian-led force armed with military 
equipment received from the Soviet Union.95  This belief turned out to be wrong.  On 
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June 5, 1967, the Israelis attacked the Egyptian airfields on the Sinai Peninsula and 
around Egypt with a surprise air attack, followed by ground attack.  These attacks caught 
Nasser off-guard, even though he had been warned, by Jordan, about the impending 
Israeli attack in advance96, and the result was the loss of the Sinai Peninsula to Israel and 
an overall loss of the war by June 10, 1967.  This loss was the beginning of the fall of 
Egypt from leadership and influence with the Arab Middle East, which will be discussed 
in Chapter IV. 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Egypt’s position within the Arab Middle East grew dramatically from 1952 to 
1967.  As discussed at length throughout this chapter, Nasser implemented many 
domestic and foreign policies that allowed Egypt to rise to a leadership role within the 
Arab Middle East.  Many of his decisions and actions were in line with the ideology of 
pan-Arabism and that of Arab unity with Egypt at the head of that unity, which was 
discussed in Chapter II.  Throughout his presidency Nasser maintained the idea that 
Egypt is and should be the leader of the Arab Middle East.  At the height of its power and 
influence, Egypt was well respected and supported by the other Arab countries within the 
region.  By 1967, however, this position of leadership and power began to fall.  This fall 
in leadership and power will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
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V. FALL OF EGYPT FROM 1967 TO 1979 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV examined the rise of Egypt as a regional power and leader of the Arab 
Middle East.  This chapter will examine Egypt’s fall from that hard-won position.  
Egypt’s decline began after the 1967 War with the Israelis, and continued to through the 
signing of the Camp David Accord in 1979.  The loss of the 1967 War and the death of 
Nasser in September 1970 forced the Egyptian government to re-examine its domestic 
and foreign policies.  Linked to that re-examination was the ascendancy to the Egyptian 
presidency of Anwar Sadat.  Both his domestic and foreign polices were instrumental in 
bringing about Egypt’s retreat from leadership and power.  Many of his new policies 
were in contradiction to those of Nasser and the ideology of pan-Arabism.  The purpose 
of this chapter is to discuss the domestic and foreign policies of Sadat and how they 
contributed to Egypt’s fall from power and influence in the Arab Middle East. 
 
B. POST-WAR YEARS UNDER NASSER 
During the three years following the 1967 War, Nasser and Egypt progressively 
lost the confidence of the Egyptian population and other Arab Middle Eastern countries.  
The 1967 loss to Israel proved to be a personal blow to Nasser and his idea of a unified 
and strong Arab society, with Egypt as its leader.  The loss showed the other Arab Middle 
Eastern countries that Egypt was unable to resist Israeli expansion into Arab lands, 
especially after Egypt lost the Suez Canal and Sinai Peninsula to the Israelis.  Nasser’s 
signing of the Rogers Plan in 1969, further proved the point that Egypt could not stand up 
to the Israelis and the West.  Offered by the United States, the Roger’s Plan was a 
diplomatic settlement to the 1967 War.  The Roger’s Plan called for Arab-Israeli talks to 
implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.97  It was viewed by Arab 
Middle Eastern countries as an accommodation to the West and a contradiction to the 
pan-Arabist ideology.   
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In the view of other Arab Middle Eastern countries, Egypt was unable to live up to its 
responsibilities as prescribed by the pan-Arabist ideology; which lead to a scale back of 
the ideology. 
The 1967 War had placed a large financial burden on the Egyptian economy.  The 
loss of the Suez Canal and the oil fields on the Sinai Peninsula meant a loss of revenue 
for the government.  Much of the country’s remaining revenue was diverted into 
rebuilding the Egyptian military and supporting those people who were displaced from 
their homes as a result of the war.98  To make matters worse, Nasser’s “social contract,” 
intended to appease his populist based among Egypt’s impoverished masses, continued to 
put pressure on the Egyptian economy, and the industrial sector began to stall.  By 1970, 
the Egyptian economy was collapsing and could no longer rely only on internal sources 
of revenue.  The economy needed foreign investment and revenue to survive, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The 1967 loss caused the Egyptian population to question the costs of leading the 
way toward a pan-Arabist future.99 Egyptian opinion wanted to maintain the country’s 
hold on power and influence within the region, but not at the expense of losing Egyptian 
land.  The loss had cost Nasser much of his political capital and there was a weakening of 
the popular support for the government.  Even though Nasser’s power base was 
declining, Nasser still maintained popular support as seen by the mass demonstrations 
supporting him after he put forth his resignation on June 9, 1967, which was later 
withdrawn.   
Although showing support for Nasser, the population felt let down by the 
government and Nasser.  They had placed their future in Nasser’s hands and now that 
future was uncertain.  The population now wanted a say in their future; as shown in the 
mass demonstrations in 1968.100  Nasser’s response was the “30 March Manifesto,” 
which called for a new constitution that would reform the ASU101, give parliament 
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control of the government, and relax controls over political expression.102  However, the 
implementation of these new reforms was centered on Nasser maintaining control over 
the government.  Nasser did not want to give up any of his power, and in November 1968 
demonstrations broke out again, now calling for Nasser’s resignation.  From 1968 to 
1970 Nasser’s popular support began to fade away and there was a strong push by the 
Egyptian population for major changes in the government.  By September 1970, these 
changes would begin to surface as Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s vice president, was elected to 
the Egyptian presidency upon Nasser’s death. 
 
C. DOMESTIC POLICIES 
When Sadat became president in 1970, the domestic situation in Egypt was in 
shambles.  The economy was collapsing, there was massive civil unrest and serious 
political in-fighting due to Nasser’s death.  Sadat had inherited a demoralized and divided 
country.103  Unlike Nasser, Sadat was not charismatic and did not have the leadership 
skills to rally the support of the population and place Egypt on top of the Arab world.104  
However, Sadat was not concerned about leading the Arab Middle East as was Nasser.  
His main concern was making Egypt stable and secure.  Upon assuming the presidency, 
Sadat continued with Nasser’s policies, but by 1971 he began to distance himself from 
the “Nasser-style” of governing and implemented new political, economic, and social 
reforms. 
By 1971, Sadat came to the conclusion that the “Nasser-style” of governing 
would not aid in the process of getting out of the “hole” it was placed in by the Nasser 
regime.  The problem was that many of the people around him were loyal to Nasser and 
his style of governing.  Domestically they believed in heavy industrialization, state 
socialism, and government control over society.105   Sadat wanted to take Egypt in a new 
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direction. In order to accomplish this he had to get rid of the people loyal to the Nasser 
regime.  From May 1 to 13, 1970, Egypt experienced the “Corrective Revolution”.  This 
revolution was Sadat’s way of correcting Nasser’s failed policies and ridding the 
government of the people who supported those policies.  Sadat dismissed vice president 
Ali Sabri and imprisoned him along with his supporters on charges of attempting to over-
throw Sadat.106  Sadat then reorganized the ASU and announced new elections for 
parliament.  The “Corrective Revolution” was successful in solidifying Sadat’s hold on 
the Egyptian presidency and power of the government.  This revolution led the way for 
Sadat’s implementation of domestic policy changes. 
Sadat began implementing changes in the political structure of the country.  He 
introduced a new constitution in September 1971 that abolished the harsh and tyrannical 
governing laws Nasser had implemented during his presidency.  This new constitution 
also gave the president the authority to rule by binding decrees rather than laws 
implemented by parliament.  One of Sadat’s major changes in the political structure of 
Egypt was allowing a certain degree of political expression by the population.  By 1975, 
Sadat had allowed political groups to form which voiced the opinions of the left, right, 
and center; these political parties were the National Progressive Unionist Organization, 
the Socialist Liberal Organization, and the Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization.107  By 
allowing these new political parties, Sadat hoped that the population would abandon the 
country’s main political force, the Nasserites, and move Egypt in a new direction.  By 
1977, two more political parties were formed, the National Democratic Party and the 
Socialist Labor Party.  This allowance of political expression was Sadat’s way of ridding 
Egypt of Nasser’s style of governing and proving that he had a new vision for Egypt. 
Part of Sadat’s changes in the political structure also included dealing with the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  Since Sadat sought to rid Egypt of Nasser’s mistakes, Sadat 
decided to tolerate the Muslim Brotherhood.  In 1974, he let the imprisoned members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood out of jail and allowed the organization to operate freely within 
the country, but he did not allow them to become a legally recognized political party.  
                                                 
106 Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt after Nasser: Sadat, peace, and the mirage of prosperity (New York: 
Paragon House Publishers, 1989), 31. 
107 Federal Research Division, Egypt: A Country Study,  http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+eg0052) (accessed: March 30, 2007). 
47 
Sadat had hoped that, by allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to operate, he would gain 
their support and be able to use them to counter any resistance he received from the 
liberal parties of the country.  Initially Sadat’s plan was successful.  Members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood were grateful to Sadat and supported many of his domestic policies.  
However, a rift formed between them by the late 1970s, chiefly over foreign policy, and 
eventually a member of the Muslim Brotherhood would assassinate Sadat in 1979. 
Sadat’s main domestic policy change was focused on the Egyptian economy.  He 
was not able to concentrate on expanding social services, i.e., education, housing, 
subsides, and other services., as Nasser had done, because of the problems with the 
economy.  Since he had inherited a collapsing and debt-ridden economy from Nasser, 
Sadat focused all of his attention on correcting that problem.  The debt incurred from the 
1967 War was not the only burden on the Egyptian economy.  Since there were not 
enough government jobs available, there were a high number of unemployed but 
reasonably well-educated people within Egypt — Nasser’s education policies having 
been more successful than those in other areas.108  Supporting these unemployed people 
placed a large burden on the government.  This coupled with the debt inherited from the 
Nasser regime forced Sadat to re-examine the Egyptian economic structure.   
Sadat understood that Egypt could no longer rely solely on its internal sources of 
revenue and that an injection of foreign capital and investment was needed.  In 
connection with this, Sadat viewed the Egyptian economy as over burdened with 
bureaucratic rules and over expansion into industrial sectors better handled by private 
businesses rather than public ones.109  Sadat placed high priority on fixing the Egyptian 
economy by modernizing the industrial sector, increasing the value of the agricultural 
sector, developing a reliable energy sector to deal with the increasing population, and 
expanding tourism within the country.  Basically, Sadat decided to base his economic 
policy on four basic principles: 1) shifting to a free market economy would attract foreign 
investment, 2) a reasonable balance was needed between industrial and agricultural 
development, 3) competition with the private sector would revitalize the public sector, 
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and 4) an effort needed to be made to manage the social and economic problems of the 
future.110  To be able to accomplish this, Sadat set out to transform and liberalize the 
Egyptian economy according to the free-market model.111 
In April 1974, Sadat issued the “October Working Paper” which stated that “the 
Egyptian economy would have to be opened up to foreign investment and that Egypt 
would accept unconditional aid and loans from abroad to aid in development.”112  Sadat 
maintained that the public sector would still be the cornerstone of the Egyptian economy, 
but the private sector was necessary to make the economy stronger.  The hope was that 
the private sector would help alleviate the unemployment problem and that the private 
sector would pay greater attention to the agricultural sector of the economy thus allowing 
more of the population to stay in the countryside rather than moving to the city.113  The 
most important part of the “October Working Paper” was the new economic policy Sadat 
would implement, which is referred to as the Infitah or “Open Door Policy.”  This new 
policy paved the way for the enactment of Law 43 in 1974 which allowed for the creation 
of private companies, encouraged foreign investment, abolished the states monopoly on 
the banking system, and allowed joint ventures between private and public sectors.114  In 
order to entice foreign investment in Egypt, the Infitah required the government to offer 
tax breaks, tariff incentives, and less governmental control over industry.115  The Infitah 
was a major liberalization of the Egyptian economy, and was a major reversal of Nasser’s 
economic policies. 
The Infitah was initially viewed as a successful economic policy.  By opening up 
the Egyptian economy to foreign investment, Sadat allowed the oil-rich Arab countries to 
invest more in Egypt, which coincided with the pan-Arabist idea of cooperation between 
Arab countries, and it reintegrated the Egyptian economy back into the world market.  
Prior to the Infitah, oil-rich Arab countries were investing approximately 350 million 
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dollars annually and after the Infitah their investments increased to 3 billion dollars 
annually.116  The oil-rich Arab countries concentrated their investments in developing 
Egypt’s oil industry and exploration of natural gas and more oil fields.117  Due to this 
“Open Door Policy” western companies were also able to invest within Egypt, however, 
which illustrated how far Sadat’s policies had departed from the ideology of pan-
Arabism.  Some of these western investments focused on the automotive, electronics, and 
pharmaceutical industries.118  The Infitah was part of a series of policies enacted by 
Sadat, which caused the fall of Egyptian leadership with the Arab Middle East.  Many of 
these other polices were within new foreign policies which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
While the Infitah had been successful is putting the Egyptian economy on the 
right track to become stronger, it did create some problems.  Initially, the GDP of Egypt 
rose an average of 9 percent a year and foreign investment rose an average of 35 percent 
a year after 1976; however, the result of the foreign investment caused foreign debt to 
rise.  Between 1973 and 1978, Egypt’s foreign debt rose from 31 percent to 66 percent of 
GNP.119  Instead of getting Egypt out of foreign debt, the Infitah had accomplished just 
the opposite.  Egypt went further into debt, overwhelmingly to the United States.  This 
increase in foreign debt can be attributed to the type of foreign investment and aid Egypt 
received from the United States as a result of the Infitah. 
Since part of the “October Working Paper” allowed for Egypt to accept foreign 
aid from abroad, the United States began sending foreign aid to Egypt in the hopes that 
the aid would stabilize the economy and make Egypt an ally.  As shown in Table 2 there 
was a substantial increase in the amount of foreign aid Egypt received from the United 
States between 1974 and 1979.  The type of foreign aid Egypt was receiving, as shown in 
Table 2, it was in the form of loans and not grants, which meant that it had to be re-paid 
at some point in time.  This further proves the point previously discussed that the Infitah 
placed more debt on the Egyptian economy.  The receipt of Western foreign aid had 
                                                 
116 Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs: foreign policy and the search for national identity, 57. 




another consequence in that it was also viewed by many Arab Middle Eastern countries 
as Egypt turning its back on the Arab world.  This further pushed Egypt way from the 
leadership role it held during the Nasser era. 
 





























1972 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.5 9.5 3.3 21.3 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 194.3 58.5 104.5 12.8 370.1 
1976 0 0 0 0 5.4 150 102.8 201.7 4.4 464.3 
TQ 0 0 0 0 0 429 107.8 14.6 1.1 552.5 
1977 0 0 0 0 0 600 99.2 196.8 11.7 907.8 
1978 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 617.4 133.3 179.7 12.5 943.2 
1979 1500 0.4 0 0 0 250 585 230.7 22.4 2588.5 
 
Table 2.   U.S. aid to Egypt 1972-1979 [$Mil] (From: CRS Report for Congress – 
Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations)120 
 
Sadat also turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for 
loans to strengthen the Egyptian economy, which also went against the ideology of pan-
Arabism.  In order to receive these loans, however, the banks required Sadat to 
implement new economic policies that would reduce the amount of public spending and 
remove certain subsides.121 Under these new policies the government reduced the 
funding of public education and health care services, removed rent control and subsidies 
on food and clothing, and stopped the building of low cost housing.122 Basically the 
government got rid of the policies and attributes which made up Nasser’s social contract.  
Under normal conditions the reduction and removal of these services would be gradual to 
allow the population to adjust, but the IMF and World Bank wanted these policies 
implemented immediately; thus not allowing the population to adjust.   
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The Infitah and Sadat’s other economic policies created a large amount of social 
unrest and discontentment.  These policies created a rift between the government and the 
population.  One of Nasser’s priorities in making Egypt the leader in the Arab Middle 
East was to have a united society, and Sadat’s new domestic policies were splitting the 
society into pieces, if for no other reason than because it created new sets of winners and 
losers economically.  Some of the population stayed loyal to the government; however, as 
the government was becoming economically reliant on the West and was decreasing 
funding for social services, the rest of the population was forced to give their support to 
someone else.  Most of this support was given to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Sadat, at noted earlier, allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to operate within the 
country.  The Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of this and economic policies of 
Sadat.  Being an Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood believed that the state should 
provide social services to the population.  Since the state was not providing these 
services, the Muslim Brotherhood began to.  The Infitah allowed the Muslim 
Brotherhood to operate a parallel and hidden economy that provided social services to the 
Egyptian population; these social services included health care, education, and 
charities.123  The charities provided food, water, clothing, and money to the population 
that was affected by the removal of subsides.   
Since public funding for education and health care decreased, the Muslim 
Brotherhood focused much of their attention to providing these social services.  Since all 
of the schools built by the Muslim Brotherhood were Islamic schools, the students were 
only taught the teachings of the Quran and the need to have a just society based on 
Islamic teachings and fundamentals.  With regards to health care services, the first 
Muslim Brotherhood hospital, established in 1947, treated over 51,000 patients in 1947.   
These patients were unable to afford the health care services at state run hospitals.124  By 
1975, the number of Egyptian citizens treated by Muslim Brotherhood hospitals increased 
to the hundreds of thousands.   
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Sadat’s Infitah policies also allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to open up Islamic 
banks and investment companies within Egypt.125  The Muslim Brotherhood took full 
advantage of the opportunity to actively participate in the Egyptian economy.  Through 
Islamic banks, the Egyptian population was able to get interest free loans and a greater 
rate of return on their investments.  These loans and investments allowed the Egyptian 
population to open up their own businesses and participate more actively in the economy.     
Providing these social services gave the Muslim Brotherhood the opportunity to 
gain the support of Egyptian population.  That support resulted in a dramatic increase in 
membership of the Brotherhood within both the middle and lower class citizens.  The 
membership occupations of the Brotherhood included students, teachers, civil servants, 
private business owners, military and police officers, merchants, and farmers.126  There 
was not an occupation that did not have members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The 
increase in support for the Muslim Brotherhood further drove a wedge between the 
population and the government.   
The support for the Muslim Brotherhood, vice the government, showed a shift of 
the population’s support from the pan-Arabist ideology to the ideology of Islam.  As 
more and more members of the population joined the Muslim Brotherhood their exposure 
to the ideology of Islam was dramatically increased.  Instead of looking at themselves as 
Arabs, the population began to view themselves as Muslims and wanted the government 
to implement policies that were in line with Islam, rather than pan-Arabism.  This rise in 
importance of Islam began to break down the support pan-Arabism once had in the 
region.  The Egyptian population began to believe that both the domestic and foreign 
policies, influenced by pan-Arabism, had not provided the unity and strength that had 
been promised by the ideology.  The population now turned to Islam as an alternative to 
pan-Arabism to provide that unity and strength.   
However, this support for the Muslim Brotherhood was not the only cause of the 
rift forming between the government and the population.  The implementation of the 
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Infitah resulted in Sadat making certain foreign policy changes that were not viewed 
favorably by the Egyptian population or the other Arab Middle Eastern countries, and 
illustrated beyond doubt that the ideology of pan-Arabism, as well as Egypt’s 
presumptive role as regional leader, was on the decline. 
 
D. FOREIGN POLICIES 
Sadat’s foreign policy went through some major changes between 1970 and 1979.  
These changes in Egypt’s foreign policies can be broken-down into two specific time 
periods; the first period being 1970 to 1973 and the second being 1973 to 1979.  During 
each of these respective periods, Sadat implemented polices that would affect Egypt’s 
position with respect to the Arab Middle East and the rest of the world.  When Sadat 
initially came to power in 1970 he maintained the foreign policies Nasser had 
implemented.  During the first three years of his presidency, Sadat’s main goals for 
foreign policy was to maintain Egypt’s position within the region, maintain the Arab 
unity obtained under Nasser, and regain the lost Egyptian land as a result of the 1967 
War.127  These three goals worked hand in hand with one another. 
From 1970 to 1973, Sadat’s main foreign policy pursuit was to re-take the lands 
Egypt had lost in the 1967 War.  This foreign policy was focused on confronting Israel 
through diplomatic channels, and if necessary through military force, to compel them to 
return Egyptian land.  To accomplish this, Sadat understood that he must have the support 
and cooperation of other Arab Middle Eastern countries.  He centered Egypt’s foreign 
policy on gathering this support and cooperation.  In 1970 Sadat entered into talks with 
Libya and Sudan to form a federation of the three countries.  This was something that 
Nasser had wanted toward the end of his life and Sadat picked up where Nasser had left 
off.128  Sadat’s hope was that this federation would help Egypt both politically and 
militarily.  Politically, Sadat would be viewed by the other leaders in the Arab countries 
as continuing Nasser’s pursuit of Arab unity.  Militarily, Libya and Sudan could help in 
providing protection of Egyptian airfields from Israel should Egypt try and re-take the 
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lands captured by Israel.  By November 1970, however, Sudan was forced, due to 
domestic issues, to withdrawal from the federation negotiations and was replaced by 
Syria.  There had already been an alliance between Egypt and Syria before and Syria was 
eager to join a new federation with Egypt.  On April 17, 1971, the three countries signed 
an agreement forming the Federation of Arab Republics.129  With this alliance in hand, 
Sadat turned his attention to other Arab countries to gather further support and unity. 
Between 1971 and 1973, Sadat worked furiously to gain the support of Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, and the Palestinians.  Sadat held many talks with King Feisal, King 
Hussein, and Yasar Arafat to bring them into the fold of Arab unity, of which Libya and 
Syria were already a part.  Sadat understood that if it came to confronting Israel militarily 
the Arab armies would have to do it on multiple fronts in order to be successful. By 1973, 
Sadat’s talks with these three individuals had been successful.  The solid Arab alliance 
had been formed, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria as the main powers within that 
alliance.  Egypt and Syria provided the necessary military power needed to wage war 
with Israel, and Saudi Arabia provided the “oil weapon” and the connection to the United 
States.130 The hope was that Saudi Arabia could pressure the United States to exert 
influence over Israel and that the Egyptian and Syrian military could push the Israeli’s 
back and hold them in place until the United States could exert their influence.   
While Sadat was gathering support from the Arab Middle Eastern countries, he 
was also trying to place Egypt in a more neutral position in the international scene.  
Under Nasser, Egypt had become politically, militarily, and economically aligned with 
the Soviet Union and isolated from the United States.  Sadat understood that in order for 
Egypt to gain a victory over Israel he would not only have to rely on the Arab countries, 
but also the United States’ influence over Israel.131  In order to become more neutral, 
Sadat expelled the 15,000 Soviet Union military advisors from Egypt in 1972.  Sadat 
hoped that the United States would view this move as a softening on Egyptian foreign 
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policy and show that Egypt did want peace with the West.132 Sadat also signed a 
friendship treaty with the Soviet Union that would allow the Soviets to avoid humiliation 
owing to Egypt’s increasing openness to the West, and live up to the military 
commitments they had already made to Egypt.  All of Sadat’s actions were part of the 
preparation for the October War in 1973. 
On October 6, 1973, Egypt along with Syria launched a surprise military offense 
against Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula and along the Syrian/Israeli border.  Over the 
next three weeks, Israel was confronted on multiple fronts by the surrounding Arab 
countries.  While Egypt and Syria maintained the largest military contingent, Iraq and 
Jordan also contributed by providing fighter squadrons and armored brigades.133  This 
collaboration between Arab countries showed an unprecedented amount of solidarity 
among Arab countries, beyond what had been seen in the 1967 War.  By the end of the 
three week period, Egypt had been successful in pushing Israeli forces off the East Bank 
of the Suez Canal, and the United States had pressured Israel to end the war.  As military 
conditions along the Canal deteriorated, however, the pressure on Egypt to save what it 
could of its initial military successes mounted.  On October 22, 1973, Egypt accepted a 
cease-fire proposed under United Nations Resolution 338, without consulting its Arab 
allies.  Many of the Arab Middle Eastern countries viewed this as a slap in the face by 
Egypt, which was looked upon as bending to the will of the West.  This was the first of 
many foreign policy decisions Sadat would make that would remove Egypt from its 
leadership position in the Arab Middle East. 
Between 1973 and 1979, Sadat’s foreign policies were again driven by his 
domestic economic policy, the Infitah.  As previously discussed the Infitah was Sadat’s 
way of opening up Egypt to foreign investment to stabilize the Egyptian economy and rid 
Egypt of its debt.  Unlike Nasser, Sadat believed that Egypt could benefit from foreign 
investment and diplomatic relations with the United States.  To accomplish this, however, 
Egypt would need to change its position concerning Israel and the United States.  On 
February 28, 1974, Egypt resumed diplomatic relations with the United States.  As part of 
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resuming diplomatic relations Sadat also agreed to end its military conflict with Israel.  In 
1974 and 1975 Egypt and Israel signed disengagement agreements, known as Sinai I and 
Sinai II, which called for the end of military conflict between the two countries. Sadat 
had again made these agreements without consulting his Arab allies, and this “go-it-alone 
policy was destroying Egypt’s traditional leadership of Arab nationalism.”134 
Sadat’s actions between 1977 and 1979 brought a decisive end to Egyptian 
regional leadership.  Sadat’s foreign policy decisions prior to 1977 caused the other Arab 
Middle Eastern countries to scale back the amount of aid they were giving to Egypt.  By 
1977, Egypt needed to have peace with Israel in order to gain more foreign aid from the 
United States to make up for the loss of Arab aid.135  In November 1977, Sadat made a 
two day “peace mission” to Jerusalem.  This was the first visit to the Israel by an Arab 
leader.  During this visit Sadat made a speech to the Knesset which basically offered 
permanent peace between the two countries and security for all the people in Israel.136  
This speech was well received by the population of Egypt, but not by Arabs elsewhere in 
the region.  Once again Sadat had made a foreign policy change that would affect all 
Arab countries without consulting with the leaders of those countries.    
1978 and 1979 saw the ultimate fall of Egypt from leadership and influence 
within the Arab Middle East.  In September 1978, Sadat held nine days of peace talks, 
which were hosted by President Carter, with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at 
Camp David.  By the end of those nine days Sadat and Begin agreed on a framework for 
a permanent peace settlement between Egypt and Israel.  This framework was quickly 
denounced by the other Arab Middle Eastern countries since the settlement only dealt 
with Egypt’s concerns and not all of the Arab communities concerns.  On March 26, 
1979, Sadat and Begin signed the Camp David Accords in the Rose Garden at the White 
House.  The signing of these accords was viewed by the Arab Middle Eastern countries 
as Egypt turning its back on them and siding with the West.  Even the Egyptian 
population viewed these accords as Sadat becoming a puppet for the United States and 
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Israel.  Mass opinion swung towards the Muslim Brotherhood, who like the other Arab 
countries, denounced the accords.  From this point on Egypt would not longer speak for 
the Arab population or be the leader of Arab unity. 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Egypt’s position within the Arab Middle East fell dramatically from 1970 to 
1979, owing chiefly to it inability, already apparent during Nasser’s lifetime, to reconcile 
its desire for regional leadership with the requirements of a sound economic policy at 
home, which included a substantial, and politically necessary, commitment to far-
reaching programs of social welfare. Sadat’s implementation of the Infitah ultimately 
insured Egypt’s fall from leadership within the Arab Middle East. Sadat’s foreign 
policies, shaped overwhelmingly by national economic requirements, were in 
contradiction to the ideology of pan-Arabism, the promotion of which has proven to be 
too expensive, above all militarily, as the two great clashes with Israel in 1967 and 1973 
had demonstrated.  Unlike Nasser, Sadat was not concerned with Egypt being the leader 
of the Arab Middle East.  Sadat’s main concern was to achieve peace with Egypt’s 
neighbors and keep Egypt domestically strong.  Sadat’s signature on the Camp David 
accords led to Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League, by any reckoning a definitive 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has sought to explain Egypt’s rise and fall in regional leadership and 
influence within the Arab Middle East between 1952 and 1979.  It has been argued that 
the key conditions that lead to the rise and fall of Egypt were personal leadership, the 
ideology of pan-Arabism, and the implementation of the Infitah.  These three factors 
played a vital role in shaping both domestic and foreign policy.  Among them, the most 
important was the ideology of pan-Arabism.  During the 1950s and 1960s pan-Arabism 
affected all aspects of Egyptian society, governmental policy, and governmental leaders.  
This ideology was vitally linked to the personal leadership styles of Nasser and Sadat, 
which in turn affected the domestic and foreign policies of both of those leaders.  This 
linkage ultimately influenced how Egypt would rise and fall in regional leadership.  A 
clear view of the importance of this ideology can be seen by its diverging application 
under the presidencies of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar el-Sadat. 
 
B. PERSONAL LEADERSHIP 
The leadership styles of President Nasser and President Sadat were complete 
opposites from one another.  Nasser was a very strong leader and was willing to go out on 
a limb for what he believed in whereas Sadat was a more timid leader and took the path 
of least resistance in his leadership style.  Nasser’s willingness to take risks allowed him 
to grab hold of the ideology of pan-Arabism and champion its goals throughout the Arab 
Middle East.  Sadat was the complete opposite.  Sadat was not the type of leader to grab 
onto something new without there being a safety net beneath him, and this  caused Sadat 
to turn away from the ideology of pan-Arabism and lean on different influences to 
support him.  These different leadership styles were influenced by the personalities and 
past experiences of each of the respective leaders.   
Nasser’s experiences while in the Egyptian army decisively shaped his opinion as 
to what Egypt should be to the Arab Middle East and how the West was a negative 
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influence on Arab countries.  The British occupation of Egypt allowed Nasser to view 
how badly Egypt was treated by the West and to imagine much better Egypt would be 
without any influence or connection to the West.  Nasser was also able to see Egypt’s 
potential in becoming the center of the Arab Middle East due to its domestic and military 
strength compared to the other countries within the region.  During his time in the 
Egyptian army, Nasser quickly rose through the ranks and gained many supporters, 
including Anwar Sadat.  
At no time prior to his rise to the Egyptian Presidency did Nasser ever back down 
from a challenge or take the easy way out.  He was the type of person that would 
continue to fight for what he believed in no matter what the consequences may be; as was 
evident in the Free Officer’s Coup in 1952.  Nasser was also the type of person who 
would rather make decisions and take the lead in implementing new ideas.  He was not 
the type of person who would sit back and allow others to take the credit or do the hard 
work.  If something had to be done or changed, Nasser would be the one to take on the 
challenge and not pass it off to someone else. 
All of these attributes of Nasser’s leadership and personality allowed him to 
connect with and lead the way for the ideology of pan-Arabism.  Nasser’s distrust and 
dislike of the West was right in line with the ideology of pan-Arabism.  As was discussed 
in Chapter III Nasser believed that the only way for the Arab countries within the region 
to be strong and successful was to rely on one another and not on the West for support, 
which was exactly what the ideology of pan-Arabism called for.  Since Nasser was the 
type of person who believed in leading the way for a cause or new idea, he seized onto 
the ideology of pan-Arabism and began promoting it throughout the Arab Middle East 
regardless of what the consequences.  This ideology proved to be very successful as 
Nasser and Egypt rose in popularity and leadership within the region.   
Sadat’s experiences were quite different from those of Nasser.  Unlike Nasser, 
Sadat’s family did not have many connections with the high class citizens in Egypt, 
consequently he grew up in meager conditions.  It was by sheer luck that Sadat’s father 
had a friend who was close to a pasha that helped Sadat get into the Obassia Military 
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College, where he met Nasser.137  The growing up in meager conditions forced Sadat to 
take on a personality and leadership style of a follower and not a leader.  Unlike Nasser, 
Sadat did not strive for leadership positions within the Egyptian Army nor did he have 
close relationships with high ranking military officials.  During his time in the Egyptian 
army, Sadat was content with just being a mid-grade officer and did not strive for more.  
This type of mentality carried on through his tenure as the Egyptian Vice President under 
Nasser and ultimately during his time as Egyptian President. 
Unlike Nasser, Sadat did not have a vision or idea of what his role and identity 
should be as an Egyptian citizen and eventually as the Egyptian President.  Ironically he 
titled his autobiography In Search of Identity.138  This provides a good sense as to what 
Sadat thought about himself.  During a two-year period in jail in the mid-1940s, Sadat 
attempted to seek a better understanding of himself and determine the deeper meanings of 
his life.139  What Sadat eventually turned to for identity was religion, specifically Islam.  
During his time in jail Sadat began to view Islam and Allah under a whole new light; he 
viewed them as the savior of the Egyptian population from the occupation and 
oppressors.140  Unlike Nasser, Sadat was much more religious and relied on spiritual 
inspiration for guidance, at least in the beginning.  In this instance, Sadat was much more 
like the rest of the Egyptian population and blended in with the masses; whereas Nasser 
took on the identity of being Arab and led the way for the Egyptian population to reassert 
themselves as Arabs instead of as Muslims.   
While in the Free Officer’s Corps, Sadat became Nasser’s “go-to-boy” for policy 
and operations.  What ever Nasser wanted done, Sadat made sure it happened.  Even 
during the coup in 1952, Nasser sent Sadat to force King Farouk to abdicate his thrown.  
This just further proves the point that Nasser had a much more commanding presence and 
ability to direct people and that Sadat was just an “errand-boy.”  This continued when 
Sadat became Nasser’s vice president. 
                                                 
137 Joseph Finklestone, Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 9. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid., 18. 
140 Ibid., 68. 
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During his tenure as Egyptian Vice President, Sadat followed the directions of 
Nasser and did not question nor offer any suggestions as to what Egyptian domestic and 
foreign policy should be.  Sadat was very timid in this regard.  He had high respect for 
Nasser and his accomplishments, but did not stand up to Nasser if he thought certain 
policies were wrong.  In fact many Egyptian politicians considered Sadat a light weight 
since he never showed any backbone.141  Sadat’s experiences growing up never put him 
in a position that would force him to fight for what he wanted or stand up for himself.  
His experiences were those of being a follower and by doing that he was able to rise to 
different high ranking positions.   
This contrast between being a leader and a follower is what shows the differences 
between Nasser and Sadat.  Nasser’s personality was one of a leader and Sadat’s was one 
of a follower.  Nasser always strove for more and Sadat always took the easy way out.  
This comparison can be seen even more in the different domestic and foreign policies of 
each of these leaders. 
 
C. DOMESTIC POLICIES 
The domestic policies during the two time periods discussed in this thesis changed 
dramatically from one period to the next.  Nothing within the domestic system of Egypt 
remained the same.  Both Nasser and Sadat had their own vision of what Egypt should be 
domestically and what was the best way to accomplish that vision.  Nasser allowed the 
ideology of pan-Arabism to influence and drive his domestic policies while Sadat took 
the opposite stance and did not allow any specific ideology to influence him.  He only did 
what he believed would be met with the least amount of resistance and easiest to 
implement. 
When it came to Egyptian society, Nasser took the stance that the society should 
be united as one unit; whereas Sadat believed it was necessary to allow various political 
and religious groups to form within Egypt.  Nasser believed that, in accordance with the 
ideology of pan-Arabism, a united society would result in a domestically strong Egypt 
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and through that unity and strength Egypt would be able to lead the Arab Middle East; 
thus the resulting outlawing of political and religious groups.  Sadat on the other hand 
was not concerned with leading the Arab Middle East.  He believed that a strong 
domestic society resulted from the Egyptian population being able to unite in various 
political and religious groups in order to voice their opinions and participate in all aspects 
of Egyptian society.  This belief resulted in the formation of various political groups and 
the reorganization of the Muslim Brotherhood and other religious.  What Sadat did not 
take into account was the fact that the formation of these groups allowed the population 
to challenge governmental policies and cause societal rifts to emerge, resulting in a weak 
domestic society.   
Militarily, Nasser and Sadat both had different ideas on how strong the Egyptian 
military should be.  In order to be the leader of the Arab Middle East, Nasser understood 
that Egypt needed to have a military strong enough to stand up to external aggression and 
protect the other Arab countries within the region.  This understanding resulted in 
massive defense spending and a large build up of the military as discussed in Chapter IV.  
Sadat, on the other hand, believed Egypt only needed to have a military strong enough to 
defend Egyptian territory from external aggression.  Since Sadat was not influenced by 
the ideology of pan-Arabism, he did not believe Egypt needed to be able to protect and 
defend the other Arab countries in the region.  This idea was taken on by Sadat after the 
Arab loss to the Israelis in the 1967 War.  Nasser’s large military had not been able to 
defend the Arabs or Egyptian territory, so for Sadat there was no need to spend massive 
amounts on an ineffective military establishment. 
The economic policies of these two Egyptian presidents were like night and day.  
Nasser wanted an internally strong economic system and Sadat wanted an externally 
strong economic system.  In accordance with the ideology of pan-Arabism, Nasser relied 
on the internal agricultural and industrial sectors of the Egyptian economy to fund his 
social services and other domestic policies.  Nasser did not allow external aid to enter 
into the Egyptian economic system due to the fact that it was in contradiction to the 
ideology of pan-Arabism.  By allowing external aid to support the Egyptian economy, 
Nasser could have been influenced by the West and forced to bend to their will; which is 
what happened to Sadat.   
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Since Sadat was not concerned about what the other Arab Middle Eastern 
countries thought about him or Egypt, he turned to the West, IMF, and World Bank for 
aid in order to support the Egyptian economy; which went against the ideology of pan-
Arabism.  Sadat also implemented the Infitah that allowed foreign investment within 
Egypt.  One of the main reasons why Sadat turned away from the ideology of pan-
Arabism as an influence on economic policy was the fact that Sadat had witnessed that 
ideology place a large financial burden on the Egyptian economy that ultimately led to 
massive debt.  Sadat did not want to continue down that road and instead wanted to get 
Egypt out of debt and economically strong.  However, the Infitah resulted in placing 
Egypt is further debt as was discussed in Chapter V.  
Sadat’s implementation of the Infitah was the turning point for Egypt fall from 
leadership and influence.  As was discussed in Chapter V the implementation of the 
Infitah was viewed by the other Arab countries as Egypt turning their back on them.  The 
Infitah itself was not a bad idea, but the allowing of the West to invest within Egypt was 
the proverbial “nail in the coffin.”  The Infitah also forced foreign policy changes that 
will be discussed later in this chapter.  Had Sadat implemented the Infitah and only 
allowed the other Arab countries to invest in and provide economic aid to Egypt, then 
things could have turned out differently for Egypt’s leadership position.  By 
implementing the Infitah in that way Sadat would have still opened up Egypt to foreign 
investment to stabilize the economy, however this foreign investment would have been 
from Arab countries which would have kept Egypt in line with the ideology of pan-
Arabism.   
These domestic policy differences between Nasser and Sadat were not the only 
influences  leading to Egypt’s rise and fall from leadership and influence within the Arab 
Middle East.  The foreign policies of these two individuals also played a very important 





D. FOREIGN POLICIES 
The major differences within foreign policy between Nasser and Sadat were their 
decisions on what nations to align Egypt with and what Nasser and Sadat wanted Egypt’s 
position to be in the Arab Middle East.  Nasser took the position of aligning Egypt with 
the Soviet Union, countries of the Soviet bloc, and other Arab countries within the 
Middle East.  He wanted Egypt to be the leader of the Arab Middle East, prescribed by 
the ideology of pan-Arabism.  Sadat, on the other hand, wanted the complete opposite.  
Sadat chose to first align Egypt with the Arab countries in the Middle East, but then 
changed his mind and aligned Egypt with the West and Israel, which was a slap in the 
face to the Arab countries within the region.  He did not want Egypt to be the leader of 
the Arab Middle East.  Instead be preferred to just make Egypt strong and on the same 
level as the other countries within the region.  Sadat’s mind set went completely against 
the ideology of pan-Arabism and was viewed by the other Arab countries within the 
region of Egypt turning its back on them. 
All of Nasser’s foreign policy decisions were in line with the ideology of pan-
Arabism and helped Egypt rise in leadership and influence.  As discussed in Chapter III 
Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, the formation of the UAR142, and the signing 
of the Arab Solidarity Pact were all foreign policy decisions that allowed Egypt become 
and maintain its leadership in Arab Middle East.  These decisions allowed Egypt to 
maintain its Arab identity and form close relationships with the other Arab countries 
within the region.  The decisions also allowed Nasser to show the other Arab Middle 
Eastern countries that Egypt was willing to stand up for and protect them should the need 
arise. 
Another one of Nasser’s foreign policy decisions that was in keeping with the 
ideology of pan-Arabism and led to Egypt’s rise in leadership was his decision to align 
Egypt with the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc.  The countries in the Arab Middle East, 
especially Egypt, had many negative experiences under the Western occupation of the 
region.  None of these countries trusted nor wanted to have close ties with the West 
again.  By choosing to cut ties with the West and align Egypt with a country, who had no 
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interest in occupying the region, Nasser showed the Arab Middle Eastern countries that 
Egypt was in the position to take on a leadership role and was open to the possibility of 
righting the wrongs the West had done to the Arab countries within the region.  Nasser 
also showed the Arab countries within the region that neither they nor Egypt needed the 
West and that they only had to rely on one another for support and protect, which was a 
pillar of the ideology of pan-Arabism.  Sadat, on the other hand, took the opposite stance 
when it came to foreign policy. 
Sadat’s foreign policy was largely influenced and driven by the Infitah and 
Sadat’s decision for Egypt not to be the leader of the Arab Middle East.  Since the Infitah 
allowed the West to invest within Egypt, Sadat had to change Egypt’s position 
concerning the West.  On top of that, since one of the West’s conditions for investing 
within Egypt was for Egypt to sign a peace treaty with Israel, Sadat had to embark on a 
new foreign policy which would allow for peace even though this would ultimately lead 
to Egypt’s fall from leadership and influence within the region. 
As discussed in Chapter V, Sadat’s new foreign policies included the signing of 
Sinai I and II, his peace mission to Jerusalem, and the signing of the Camp David 
Accords in 1979.  All of these decisions were made without Sadat consulting with the 
other Arab countries within the Middle East.  These foreign policy decisions ultimately 
affected the other countries within the region and Sadat decided not to get their input or 
fight for what they wanted.  This was in complete contradiction to the ideology of pan-
Arabism.  Sadat had turned his back on the idea of Arab unity and sided with the West 
and Israel.   
For Sadat it was much easier to succumb to the will of the West than it was to 
stand up to them and for the rights of the Arab Middle Eastern countries.  This goes back 
to Sadat’s personality and leadership style.  Since Sadat was timid and a follower he did 
not have the back-bone or the will to continue the policies which Nasser had championed, 
those being Arab unity and leadership in the region.  If Sadat would have had Nasser’s 
leadership style he would have been able to stand up to the West, and Egypt would have 
maintained its position within the region.  Instead, Egypt fell from leadership and 
influence. 
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E. CURRENT AND FUTURE STATUS 
Even though Egypt fell from its leadership position and its large-scale influence 
decreased within the region, the country has still maintained a small amount of influence 
with the Arab Middle East. The leaders and populations of the region still remember the 
power and position Egypt once had and believe that Egypt has the potential to rise to that 
position once again.  Even current events today show how Egypt is viewed, not only by 
the Arab Middle East countries, but by the international community as well. 
Anytime there is a problem within the region, the international community turns 
to Egypt to take the lead in trying to solve the problem or offer advice.  This is proven by 
Egypt’s involvement in the Middle East peace process.  Egypt has become very involved 
in the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians.  Both the United States and 
the Arab Middle Eastern countries have turned to Egypt to hold peace conferences and 
negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, which have had some success. 
A more recent event was Egypt’s announcement that they were restarting their 
civilian nuclear program for energy needs.  While there is much debate around this 
announcement, the notion that Egypt is restarting its program as a response to the 
growing Iranian influence within the region and their nuclear program cannot be 
dismissed.  Since Egypt already had a program in place, it is not going to take much for 
them to restart their program, and their decision to restart the program could be Egypt’s 
way of re-establishing themselves as a leader and protector of the Arab Middle East from 
external aggression.  This is an action welcomed by the other Arab countries in the 
region. 
What is clear about the current and future state of the leadership position within 
the Arab Middle East is that it has not been filled since 1979.  After Egypt fell from that 
position no other country has been able to rise to the position.  This is not to say that 
other major countries within the region have not tried, but they have been unsuccessful.  
Saddam tried to vault Iraq to that leadership position during the 1980s and 1990s, but 
failed.  Iran is trying to claim that position, but a Persian country will not be able to be 
the leader of Arab countries, not to mention that Iran’s position within the international 
community is very tenuous.  Saudi Arabia has never attempted to take over the leadership 
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of the region even though they would be in a good position to become a leader.  There is 
no concrete reason as to why Saudi Arabia has not taken that step, but one could argue 
that they are content with the position they hold within the region and international 
community.  Egypt is beginning to re-assert itself, but President Mubarak does not have 
the leadership style to put Egypt back into a position of leadership within the region.  
There is the possibility that his son, Gamal Mubarak, has the necessary personal qualities, 
but only time will tell. 
I would venture to argue that no other countries have been able to fill that 
leadership position because they have not had or do not have the same type of 
charismatic and strong leader that Egypt had with Nasser.  Nasser was a unique 
individual.  He was able to rally the masses around his cause and be the leader the Arab 
countries wanted him to be.  No other leader since him has had that ability.  If a leader 
comes along who has the same attributes as Nasser, then they could possibly put their 
country in that vacant position of leadership.  For right now, that position will remain 
vacant. 
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